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ABSTRACT 
Safety measure design and accident predictive and prevention strategies are critical in the 
offshore process. The key area of concern in an offshore facility is a major event such as 
a fire, an explosion and the release of hazardous materials. The recent BP Transocean 
Deepwater Horizon accident is an example of safety protocols either being inadequate or 
response being inefficient and ineffective. Understanding the consequences of major 
release events is a key step in safety measure design and consequence assessment of 
major events. The assessment includes the definition of different release scenarios, 
release modeling, event modeling, and damage/loss quantification. The consequence 
assessment is an important step of risk estimation and is subsequently used to design 
safety measures. 
To address release scenario modeling, a new methodology is developed in the current 
study to revise the emission factor estimation methods earlier developed by USEP A. 
Applying a non-linear regression approach, a new set of equations is introduced to 
estimate emission rates. Having ~AIC values of more than 10, in the categories of pump 
seals, connectors, flanges and others, the equations replace USEP A's proposed 
correlation equations for oil and gas facilities. 
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) is used to simulate different release scenarios, 
particularly to study fire, explosion and toxic dispersion. The Flame Acceleration 
Simulator (FLACS), a CFD tool, is used to model explosion and toxic dispersion of 
ll 
combustion products. To improve the consequence modeling work, a systematic 
approach for CFD modeling of Vapour Cloud explosion (VCE) is also introduced. Fire 
Dynamic Simulator (FDS) is used to model pool and jet fires. 
A novel integrated approach in modeling the evolving accident scenanos 1s also 
developed in the current study. To develop the toxic risk profile of combustion products 
of an installation, a risk-based approach is proposed, overcoming the shortcomings of a 
concentration-based approach. 
The newly developed approaches and models are tested on real-life case studies. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
1.2 Consequence analysis 
Increasing energy demand is driving offshore exploration to more remote, deeper, and 
harsher environments and as a result safety issues and accident prediction and prevention 
are becoming increasingly challenging. 
The key areas of concern are maJor accidents, starting from a hydrocarbon release 
leading to dispersion, fire, and explosion that may likely occur. As shown in Figure 1.1 , 
there are seven steps in a detailed quantitative risk analysis. Consequence analysis is the 
most important step. It begins with defining the potential accident scenarios, evaluating 
the event consequences, and estimating the event impacts. This approach can be used as 
a tool in prevention and/or mitigation of accidents. 
The current study focuses on the following tasks: 
• Development of a methodology for release scenanos and emtsswn factors 
assessment. 
• Development of an integrated methodology for dispersion, fire, and explosion 
scenario modeling. 
• Development of an approach to integrate consequence assessment into a risk 
assessment framework. 
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• Development of a risk evaluation methodology and its integration with design of 
safety measures. 
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Figure 1.1. Quantitative risk analysis flowchart 
Figure 1.2 demonstrates the focus of the current work presented in this thesis. 
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1.3 Motivation 
Due to the lack of available detailed quantitative methods and tools for consequence 
assessment, this work explored the application of CFD codes FLCAS and FDS to 
analyze the consequences involving the release of hydrocarbons and the subsequent 
events in an offshore oil and gas installation. This work has also explored the interaction 
of different consequence events. The current work attempts to address the following 
points: 
• Estimation of emission factor was extensively studied through various researches 
[USEPA, 1995; Dubose et al., 1982; API, 1993a; API, 1993b; API, 1995]. Methods 
for estimating emission factors include the average emission factor approach, 
screening range approach, USEPA's correlation approach and unit-specific 
correlation approach. However, the mentioned methods suffer from a lack of 
precision. In the present work, a methodology is proposed in order to better 
estimate emission factors in oil and gas facilities, optimizing USEPA's correlation 
approach. 
• Using CFD codes to simulate the vapour cloud explosion (VCE) due to a 
hydrocarbon release is a common method and is applied in many studies; CFD 
codes were used in defining the obstacles' configuration on an installation to 
reduce the risk [Berg et al., 2000], to investigate the effects of natural and 
mechanical configurations on explosion overpressure [Moros et al., 1996] and to 
estimate the damages caused by explosion overpressure on a platform [Wingerden 
5 
and Salvesen, 1995]. However, these studies modeled the explosion phenomenon 
based only on stoichiometric volume of the flammable fuel vapour, ignoring the 
dispersion characteristics of the flammable vapour. Due to the importance of 
dispersion characteristics on the resulted explosion overpressure, the current study 
proposes a methodology to simulate VCE considering the dispersion of the 
flammable vapour. 
• Comprehensive studies have been done to model the consequences of the release of 
hydrocarbons; these studies range from advanced CFD simulation to comparison of 
different tools in accident modeling [Hansen et al, 2009; Gavelli et al., 201 0; Kim 
and Salvesen, 2002; Skarsbo, 2011; Suardin et al., 2009; Yun et al., 2011; Qi et al, 
201 0]. One shortcoming in above mentioned studies is that they only focus on 
assessing individual events such as fire or explosion, ignoring the interactions 
among events. The combination of events is very important, as one event may lead 
to another and escalate the overall consequence. Through the current study, the 
authors highlight the importance of integral accident scenarios and their use in 
consequence analysis. 
• Offshore personnel spend most of their time in the semi enclosed processing area 
or the enclosed office/residential area. Thus, it is important to minimize harmful 
effects during an accidental event. According to Pula et al. (2005), fire is the most 
frequent accident occurring on offshore installations. One of the main sources of 
concern is the combustion of hydrocarbons due to accidents causing fire [Hartzell, 
2001]. Thus, there is a need to carefully assess the hazards caused by a fire 
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accident such as heat radiation and airborne toxic contaminants (combustion 
products). Safety measure design and emergency preparedness is not very effective 
if they are only based on contaminants' concentration. Personnel spent different 
time durations in various locations of the plant (different exposure time), and the 
concentration of various toxic substances cannot be simply added. To overcome 
this shortcoming, the current research exploits a risk-based approach considering 
the time duration for which personnel are exposed to air pollutants in different 
sections of a plant. Additionally, it helps to combine the harmful effects caused by 
various toxic substances [Markatos, 2012]. 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is written in manuscript format (paper based) as explained below: 
In chapter 2, the novelties and contributions this thesis has made to consequence analysis 
are discussed. Novel approaches to emission factor estimation, vapour cloud explosion 
modeling (VCE), integrated fire and explosion consequence analysis and combustion 
products toxicity assessment are explained in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 discusses the literature review associated with this thesis. Release modeling 
approaches, dispersion modeling methods, and fire and explosion modeling related 
studies are presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 presents the emission factor estimation methodology proposed through the 
present work. Past approaches of emission factor estimation and their shortcomings, and 
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a novel approach to precisely estimate the emission factors in oil and gas facilities are 
discussed. There is also a set of new equations, based on the proposed methodology, with 
a qualitative comparison with the USEP A equations to estimate the emission factors. 
This chapter is published in the Journal of Process Safety and Environmental Protection 
2011; 89: 295-299. 
In chapter 5, a systematic approach to model the VCE through the application of CFD 
codes is introduced. The limitations of associated studies and how the current work 
overcomes these shortcomings are also presented in detail with a real case study. This 
chapter is published in the Journal of Safety Science 2013,· 57: 150-160. 
Chapter 6 discusses an integrated approach to fire and explosion consequence analysis. 
The limitations of past consequence modeling methodologies are explained in this 
chapter. The main contribution of this work is the consideration of interactions of events 
in an evolving accident scenario. This chapter presents the approach with two case 
studies; a hypothetical case study with the focus on VCE and the consequent pool fire, 
and a real case study with the focus of VCE and the consequent jet fire. The chapter is 
submitted to the fire safety journal for publication. 
Chapter 7 presents a risk-based approach in combustion products' toxicity risk 
assessment. The advantages of a risk-based approach over a concentration-based one in 
toxicity risk assessment are mapped in an offshore installation. The chapter is submitted 
to the journal of process safety and environmental protection for publication. 
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Chapter 8 presents the conclusions of the current research. There are also 
recommendations provided for future work towards the end of this chapter. 
1.5 References 
American Petroleum Institute (API). (1993a). Development of fugitive emission factors 
and emission profiles for petroleum marketing terminals. Health and environmental 
sciences. Washington, D.C. : American Petroleum Institute. 
American Petroleum Institute (API). (1993b ). Fugitive hydrocarbon emissions from oil 
and gas production operations. Health and environmental sciences. Washington, D.C.: 
American Petroleum Institute. 
American Petroleum Institute (API). (1995). Emission factors for oil and gas production 
operations. Health and environmental sciences. Washington, D.C. : American Petroleum 
Institute. 
Berg, J. T ., Bakke, J. R. , Feamly, P., & Brewerton, R. B. (2000). CFD layout sensitivity 
study to identify optimum design of a FPSO. Offshore technology conference. Houston, 
Texas. 
Dubose, D. A., Steinmetz, J. I., & Harris, G. E. (1982). Frequency of leak occurrence 
and emission factors for natural gas liquid plants. U. S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Research triangle park, NC 27711. 
9 
Gavelli, F., Davis, S. G., & Hansen, 0. R. (201 0). Evaluating the potential for 
overpressures from the ignition of an LNG vapour cloud during offloading. Journal of 
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 24, 908-915. 
Hansen, 0. R., Ichard, M., & Davis, S. G. (2009). Validation of FLACS against 
experimental data sets from the model evaluation database for LNG vapour dispersion. 
Journal of loss prevention in the process industries, 23, 857-877. 
Hartzell, G. E. (2001). Engineering analysis of hazards to life safety in fires: the fire 
effluent toxicity component. Safety science, 38, 147-155. 
Koo, J., Kim, H. S., So, W., Kim, K. H., & Yoon, E. S. (2009). Safety assessment of 
LNG terminal focused on the consequence analysis of LNG spills. Proceeding of the 1st 
annual gas processing symposium, (pp. 325-311). Doha, Qatar. 
Markatos, N. C. (2012). Dynamic computer modeling of environmental systems for 
decision making, risk assessment and design. Asia-Pacifc journal of chemical 
engineering, 7, 182-205. 
Moros, A., Tam, V., Webb, S., Paterson, K., & Coulter, C. (1996). The effect of 
ventilation and gas cloud size on explosion overpressure. International conference on 
health, safety and environment. New Orleans. 
10 
Pula, R., Khan, F. 1., Veitch, B., & Amyotte, P. (2005). Revised fire consequence models 
for offshore quantitative risk assessment. Journal of loss prevention in the process 
industries, 18, 443-454. 
Qi, R. , Ng, D. , Cormier, B. R., & Mannan, M.S. (2010). Numerical simulations of LNG 
vapour dispersion in Brayton fire training field tests with ANSYS CFX. Journal of 
Hazardous Materials, 183, 51-61. 
Skarsbo, L. R. (2011). An experimental study of pool fires and validation of different 
CFD fire models. Master thesis submitted to the Department of physics and technology, 
University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway. 
Suardin, J. A., Wang, Y., Willson, M., & Mannan, M. S. (2009). Field experiments on 
high expansion (HEX) foam application for controlling LNG pool fire. Journal of 
Hazardous Materials, 165, 612-622. 
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). (1995). Protocol for equipment leak 
emission estimates. Office of air quality planning and standards, research triangle park, , 
NC 27711. 
Wingerden, K. V., & Salvesen, H. C. (1995). Simulation of an accidental vapour cloud 
explosion. Process safety progress, 14, 173-181. 
11 
Yun, G., Ng, D., & Mannan, M.S. (2011). Key findings of liquefied natural gas pool fire 
outdoor tests with expansion foam application. Industrial and Engineering Chemistry 
Research, 50, 2359-2372. 
12 
2 Novelty and contribution 
2.1 Overview 
This thesis is comprised of four main topics: i) release modeling, ii) vapour cloud 
explosion modeling, iii) integration of evolving fire and explosion consequence 
modeling, and iv) toxicity risk assessment. The novelties and contributions made for 
each topic are detailed below. 
2.1.1 Release modeling 
In this research, a non-linear regression method is used to better estimate the emission 
factors in oil and gas facilities. Although the emission factor estimation approaches were 
developed by the USEP A, they lack accuracy. This study optimizes the existing methods 
and models used for hydrocarbon emission assessment in oil and gas facilities by: 
• introducing a new set of equations to estimate leak rates in oil and gas facilities. 
• developing a quantitative comparison of the proposed equations and the ones 
proposed by USEP A, and 
• defining a set of recommendations for the use of a specific leak rate equation. 
This contribution is discussed in chapter 4. 
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2.1.2 Vapour cloud explosion (VCE) modeling 
In the current work, a systematic procedure is introduced to model the VCE with the 
application of CFD tools. CFD codes are only recently begining to be used in associated 
studies to simulate the VCE phenomenon and they suffer the following limitations: 
• lack of a systematic approach to model the VCE presenting associated 
consequences. 
• use of stoichiometric volume of the flammable fuel for explosion modeling, 
ignoring the dispersion characteristics of the flammable vapour. 
Dispersion behaviour of the flammable vapour plays a significant role in the 
consequences of the VCE. Thus, the current study proposes a VCE modeling algorithm 
based on: 
• recreating the sequence of the vapour cloud dispersion and explosion during a 
recent VCE accident, and 
• integrating of dispersion and explosion using CFD code FLACS. 
Consideration of the dispersion characteristics of the flammable fuel helps to precisely 
estimate the explosion overpressure and to overcome uncertainties associated with 
damage impacts that directly feed into the risk assessment. Considering the extent and 
location of the overpressure helps to design risk controls and mitigative measures. The 
research aims for a better understanding of how to use CFD in the modeling of VCE. 
This contribution is explained in chapter 5. 
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2.1.3 Integration of fire and explosion consequences 
There are extensive studies to model the consequences involved m the release of 
hydrocarbons. The mam limitation of these studies is that they consider only an 
individual event such as fire or explosion independently, ignoring the interactions of 
these events. The current study proposes a novel approach to model the consequences 
considering the interaction of different events using CFD codes FLACS and FDS. An 
integrated approach is also adopted to evaluate the cumulative impact of the explosion 
overpressure and the fire heat load. 
There are many studies exploring chains of accidents starting from one unit and 
spreading to different units, such as the release of hydrocarbon from a pipeline causing 
an explosion, and subsequently involving reactors, storage vessels and others units. The 
major difference between the current study and the studies based on the domino effects is 
that the current study focuses on an evolving accident scenario of one unit and the 
occurrence of more than one event. The domino effects studies, however, focus on the 
escalation of events from one unit to other units and may include different hazardous 
chemicals. The integrated scenario and the assessment of the cumulative risk makes the 
current research unique. This contribution is presented in chapter 6. 
2.1.4 Combustion products toxicity risk assessment 
In the current research, a risk-based methodology is proposed to monitor and manage 
dispersion of combustion products. Evaluating the toxic dispersion at an offshore 
installation based only on concentrations misses the impact of dispersion and the additive 
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effects of the gas mixture. Personnel spend different amounts of time at different 
locations of the facility, including the processing area, the office area and the 
accommodation area. Combustion products are gas mixtures such as carbon monoxide, 
nitrogen dioxide, methane and smoke and thus cannot be simply added together. A risk-
based approach considers the exposure duration that any individual spends at different 
parts of an installation in assessing the risk of exposure. As risk has an additive 
characteristic, this approach takes into account the cumulative impacts caused by various 
combustion products. The proposed approach helps to develop effective monitoring and 
safety measures design to minimize the effects of toxic substances, and also provides a 
tool for effective emergency management. This contribution is discussed in chapter 7. 
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3 Literature review 
3.1 Consequence analysis 
Consequence analysis includes three major steps as follows (Figure 1.1): 
• Defining the potential accident scenarios 
• Evaluating the event consequences 
• Estimating the event's impact 
3.1.1 Defining the potential accident scenarios 
After a hydrocarbon release on an offshore installation, there are several potential 
accident scenarios, depending on conditions such as fuel type, surrounding ventilation 
conditions and ignition time and location. Fire, explosion and toxic dispersion are likely 
accident scenarios after a hydrocarbon release [Assael and Kakosimos, 201 0] . 
3.1.1.1 Toxic dispersion 
The airborne transport of toxic material beyond the release point and into the region or 
exposed community is described by dispersion phenomenon. Parameters such as wind 
speed, atmospheric stability, ground conditions, height of the release, and momentum 
and buoyancy of the initial material released influence the atmospheric dispersion of 
toxic materials (Crowl and Louvar, 2001). 
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3.1.1.2 Fire 
An exothermic oxidation which occurs in the gas phase is called fire. The mixing of 
flammable gases with air or other oxidants results in a fire. Fire types are classified as 
pool fire, fire ball, jet fire and flash fire which are explained as follows: 
3.1.1.2.1 Pool fire 
Pool fires are the formation of a pool of a flammable substance through a liquid state 
outflow followed by an ignition. The occurrence of this type of fire is due to the release 
of jet fuels and diesel oils, hydrocarbons (heavier than hexane), glycols, oils and 
hydraulic fluids. Meteorological conditions play a significant role in the characteristics of 
this type of fire. The amount of the evapourated flammable material is also an important 
parameter determining the pool fire duration. There are three categories of pool fires: 
confined pool fires, unconfined pool fires, and fires on water [Khan and Abbassi, 1999]. 
3.1.1.2.2 Fire ball 
A very rapid pressurized outflow of flammable gas followed by an ignition could lead to 
the fire ball. Due to the high pressure of the flammable material, the formation of the fire 
ball does not depend on the meteorological conditions. This type of fire has a short 
duration (Assael and Kakosimos, 2010]. 
3.1.1.2.3 Jet fire 
The formation of the jet fire is through the immediate ignition of a high-pressurized 
outflow of a flammable gas. The release of light hydrocarbons, natural gas, gases with 
18 
flammable condensates, high-pressure hydrocarbon gases, and fuels could lead to a jet 
fire. Like the fire ball, the formation of the jet fire is not influenced by meteorological 
conditions, due to the high pressure release of the flammable substance [Pula et al., 
2005]. 
3.1.1.2.4 Flash fire 
An immediate ignition of a sudden high-pressurized outflow of a flammable substance 
could result in a flash fire. The condition under which the flash fire occurs is not 
perfectly understood. The shock wave through this type of fire is negligible while the 
duration of fire is short. The impact on compartments/equipment outside the vapour 
cloud is limited. However, the facilities inside the cloud are exposed to the burning part 
of the cloud. In risk analysis studies, this type of fire is considered because of its 
consequences for people [Pula et al., 2006]. 
3.1.1.3 Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) 
The leakage of a flammable gas could form a flammable vapour cloud. The resulting 
damage is a function of the conditions of the accident. If there is no ignition, the 
flammable vapour could be dispersed depending on the congestion/ventilation condition 
of the geometry. However, there could be a flash fire through an immediate ignition. If a 
delayed ignition (5-10 minutes) happens, a VCE is a probable consequence. The 
composition of the flammable gases and the ability of the ignition source to supply the 
required energy are the effective parameters for VCE [Assael and Kakosimos, 2010]. 
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The VCE behaviour is influenced by several parameters which have been evaluated 
through different qualitative studies. The ignition probability increases with an increase 
in the size of the vapour cloud. The probability of explosion rather than fire is another 
effective parameter. Furthermore, the impact of the explosion could be affected by the 
turbulent mixing of vapour and air, and also by the location of ignition sources [Crowl 
and Louvar, 2001]. 
3.1.2 Evaluating the event consequences 
The following sections review the available tools to model the consequences caused by 
toxic dispersion, fire and explosion. 
3.1.2.1 Toxic dispersion modeling 
To evaluate the consequences caused by toxic substances at an offshore installation, the 
concentrations of toxic substances are estimated by the use of dispersion models. 
Dispersion models are classified as empirical, Lagrangian, and Eulerian models [Assael 
and Kakosimos, 2010]. 
3.1.2.1.1 Empirical models 
Empirical models are classified as Gaussian models and Box models. The basic 
assumption in Gaussian models is the occurrence of steady dispersion in an infinite ideal 
medium. These models are simple to use and computationally rapid. Box models are 
even simpler than empirical ones, as their main assumption is the box shape of the region 
of interest. The emission concentration distribution in Box models is assumed to be 
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homogenous. Due to this simplicity, these models are not suitable to predict the 
distribution of emission concentrated over an airshed. 
3.1.2.1.2 Lagrangian models 
In Lagrangian models, the motion of pollution plume particles is mathematically 
modeled as a random walk during the time while these particles move in the atmosphere. 
Thus, by calculating the statistics of a large number of particles' tracks, the emission 
dispersion is predicted. 
3.1.2.1.3 Eulerian models 
The mathematical approach in Eulerian models is based on the solution of the common 
differential equations of continuity integrated over the turbulent time scale. These models 
are well established for the condition under which the atmospheric characteristics or the 
pollution distribution are complex. Though Eulerian models are more accurate, the 
computational time and the complexity of the equation limit application to large-scale 
spatial calculations due to cost limits. 
3.1.2.2 Fire modeling 
Radiation heat is the consequence of a fire causing damage. Thus, in order to assess the 
radiation heat flux, the characteristics of the fire should be known. Fire models are 
capable of estimating the characteristics such as fire diameter, flame length, and flame 
drag. Fire models are categorized as point source models, solid flame models, field 
models, and zone models. Solid flame models have the advantage of flame geometry and 
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external thermal radiation, which is important for offshore fires. These models are simple 
to apply and easy to program and have a short run time. Offshore fires are categorized as 
four major types: pool fires, jet fires, flash fires, and fire balls [Pula et al., 2005]. 
3.1.2.3 VCE modeling 
Most of the explosion damage is caused by the blast wave as a consequence of the 
explosion; the blast is made up of the combination of the pressure wave, the change in 
overpressure during the period of explosion, and subsequent wind. Table 3.1 
demonstrates the estimated damages based on different overpressure intensities. 
Table 3.1. Damage estimates for common structures based on overpressure [Crowl and Louvar, 
2001) 
Pressure (bar) Damage 
0.17 50% destruction of brickwork of houses 
Heavy machines (3000 lb) in industrial building suffer little 
0.21 damage; Steel frame buildings distort and pull away from 
foundations 
021-0.28 Frameless, self-framing steel panel buildings demolished; rupture 
of oil storage tanks 
0.28 Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptures 
0.34 Wooden utility poles snap; tall hydraulic presses ( 40,000 lb) m buildings slightly damaged 
0.34-0.48 Nearly complete destruction of houses 
0.48 Loaded train wagons overturned 
0.48-0.55 Brick panels, 8-12 in. thick, not reinforced, fail by shearing or flexure 
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Pressure (bar) Damage 
0.62 Loaded train boxcars completely demolished 
Probable total destruction of buildings; heavy machine tools (7000 
0.69 lb) moved and badly damaged, very heavy machine tools (12,000 
lb) survive 
VCE models are categorized as empirical models, phenomenological models, CFD 
models and advanced CFD models. 
3.1.2.3.1 Empirical models 
Empirical models were developed based on correlations obtained using experimental 
data [Ledin, 2002]. The TNT equivalency method, the TNO Multi-Energy method, the 
Baker-Strehlow method, and the congestion assessment method are the most common 
empirical methods. Table 3.2 demonstrates the advantages and disadvantages of these 
models. 
Table 3.2. Comparison of the empirical models 
Model Advantages Disadvantages 
Difficulty in choosing the yield 
factor 
Simple to use Weak representation of weak TNT Equivalency method gas explosions 
[Bjerkedvedt et al., 1997] Validated use of empirical Only representation of the data positive phase duration 
Not suitable for gas explosions 
Difficulty m defining the 
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Model 
TNO 
method 
Multi-Energy 
[Mercx and Van Den 
Berg, 1997] 
Baker-Strehlow method 
[Baker et al., 1994] 
Advantages 
Fast method 
Conservative 
approximations 
Considering some 
geometrical/ confinement 
details 
Handling 
points 
multi-ignition 
Easy to use with short run 
times 
Congestion 
method 
Applicable to a large 
number of experiments due 
assessment to the calibration 
[Cates and Samuels, 1991] 
Sensible maximum over-
pressure when the severity 
goes to infinity 
Applicable to non-
symmetrical congestion and 
long, narrow plant 
Disadvantages 
sensible charge centre 
Difficulty to define a sensible 
value of the charge strength 
Difficulty to define a sensible 
value of the total combustion 
energy 
Not suitable for weak explosions 
Dealing with several congested 
regions is not clear 
Dealing with multiple blast 
waves is not clear 
Over conservative 
Only a crude representation of 
the geometry 
Non-uniqueness m 
specification of level 
congestion/confinement 
the 
of 
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3.1.2.3.2 Phenomenological models 
As simplified physical models, phenomenological models represent the essential physics 
of explosions. The greatest simplification is made in geometry which is replaced by an 
idealized system instead of the actual scenario geometry. However, these models are not 
appropriate under the condition of more complex geometries (Ledin, 2002). The Shell 
Code for Overpressure Prediction in gas Explosions (SCOPE) and Confined Linked 
Chamber Explosions (CLICHE) are common phenomenological models with their 
strengths and weaknesses as explained in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3. Comparison of the phenomenological models 
Model 
SCOPE 
[Puttock et al. , 2000] 
CLICHE 
[Fairweather and Vasey, 
1982] 
Advantages 
Handling venting and 
external explosions 
Sensible flame speeds 
Validated against different 
scales of 
experiments/different 
gases/different degrees of 
congestion 
Less geometrical detail than 
CFD models 
Fast tool to evaluate 
different scenanos during 
the design phase 
Ignition location could be 
anywhere in the cuboidal 
volume 
Simple combustion model 
Disadvantages 
Less flow field information 
compared to CFD models 
Not appropriate for 
complex geometries with 
high degrees of details 
Dealing only with single 
enclosures 
Representation of 
geometries is simplified 
Less flow field information 
compared to CFD models 
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Model Advantages Disadvantages 
Representation of the flame 
distortion due to vents 
Handling external 
explosions 
Input parameters could be 
imported from an obstacle 
database 
Short run times 
3.1.2.3.3 Computational fluid dynamic (CFD) models 
Applying CFD models, the partial differential equations governing the explosion process 
are solved by finding their numerical solutions. Through the application of these models, 
the solution domain is discretized to sub-domains in order to generate the numerical 
solutions. Then, a series of coupled algebraic equations are generated through the 
application of conservative equations to each sub-domain [Ledin, 2002]. Some common 
CFD models with their advantages and disadvantages are explained in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4. Comparison of the CFD models 
Model Advantages Disadvantages 
Spatial resolution of 
obstacles 
EXSIM Using standard k-£ model 
Validated against different 
[Ledin, 2002] scales of experiments No local grid refinement 
Applicable to 
congested/unconfined 
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Model 
FLACS 
[Hanna et al., 2004] 
AutoReaGas 
[Ledin, 2002] 
Advantages 
geometries 
Applicable to external 
explosions 
Readable in CAD data 
Validated against different 
scales scenarios 
Second order accurate 
discretization scheme for 
the reaction process 
Applicable to congested, but 
confined geometries 
Applicable to external 
explosions 
Readable in CAD data 
Water deluge model 
Validated against different 
scales scenarios 
Water deluge model 
Readable in CAD data 
Acceptance of a large 
number of objects 
Disadvantages 
First order accurate for all 
variables except for the 
reaction progress variables 
Calibrated for 1 m cube 
grid cell size (versions up 
to 1993) 
No recent development m 
the open literature 
First order accurate for all 
variables 
Using standard k-E model 
In the current study, Flame Acceleration Simulator (FLACS) is used to model dispersion 
and explosion phenomenon. Using a finite volume method on a Cartesian grid, FLACS 
solves the conservation equations of mass, momentum, enthalpy, and mass fraction of 
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species which are closed by the ideal gas law. Equation 3.1 represents the conservation 
equations: 
(3.1) 
where t, p, u and ¢ represent time (s), density (kgm-3) , velocity (m/s) and general 
variable. The numerical model resolves diffusive fluxes with second order scheme and 
convective fluxes with a second order k scheme. FLACS uses a first order backward 
Euler time stepping scheme [GEXCON, 2010]. 
3.1.2.3.4 Advanced CFD models 
The advanced CFD models are capable of presenting the explosion process in a more 
descriptive way. The exact geometric representation throughout the explosion simulation 
is one of the valuable features in advanced CFD models. However, this presents a 
problem which is the limitation of the available computer memory (Ledin, 2002). The 
accuracy of the numerical scheme is another advantage of advanced CFD models. CFX-
4, COBRA, NEWT, REACFLOW, and Imperial College Research Code are some 
common advanced CFD models with the strengths and weaknesses as explained in Table 
3.5. 
Table 3.5. Comparison of the advanced CFD models 
Model Advantages Disadvantages 
CFX-4 Multi-block capability Not suitable for gases other 
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Model 
[Pritchard et al., 1999] 
COBRA 
[Popat et al., 1996] 
NEWT 
[Watterson et al., 1998] 
REACFLOW 
[Wilkenings and Huld, 1999] 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Different options for than CH4 and H2 
discretization 
Readable in CAD data 
Thin flame model which is 
not suitable for explosion 
Integrated 
building 
geometry Deficiencies with the 
ignition model 
Suitable for CH4 and H2 Explosion and ignition 
deflagration models are poorly validated 
Second order 
spatial and 
discretization 
accurate 
temporal 
Cartesian mesh and also 
handling cylindrical polar 
or arbitrary hexahedral 
meshes 
Advanced grid 
refinement/de-refinement 
facility 
Readable in CAD data 
Adaptive mesh algorithm 
Less effort during the mesh 
generation than with the 
use of unstructured meshes 
Use of any tetrahedral mesh 
generator 
Easier meshing than with 
the use of unstructured 
meshing 
Adaptive mesh capability 
Accurate solver and second 
Using the standard k-e 
model and offering 
Wolfshtein's two layer k-e 
model 
Time-consuming and 
difficult when the geometry 
is complex 
Lack of a model for 
transition from laminar to 
turbulent flow 
Slow and difficult 
visualization of the flow 
field 
Standard k-e model, but 
with a better near wall 
damping 
Crude ignition model 
Crude transition model 
Standard k-e model 
Simple combustion model 
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Model 
Imperial College Research 
Code 
[Lindstedt and Vaos, 1999] 
Advantages 
order, Van Leer 
discretization scheme 
Higher order spatial and 
temporal discretization 
techniques 
Adaptive 
capability 
meshing 
Detailed chemical kinetics 
Disadvantages 
Long run times for large 
scale problems 
Great requirements for 
computer memory 
Realistic method 
obtaining the PDF 
of Not readily available as a 
research code 
Available m parallelized 
form 
3.1.3 Event impact estimation 
The explosion overpressure damages to people are categorized as lung damage, eardrum 
rupture, head impact, whole body displacement and injury from fragments and debris 
[Assael and Kakosimos, 2010]. In lung damage, the sudden extreme pressure difference 
causes the pressure increase in the lung leading to lung damage and possible death. This 
sudden pressure difference can also lead to eardrum rupture injury. As a tertiary effect, 
the head impact can occur due to the shock wave pushing the head backward and leading 
to skull rupture or fracture and possible death. Another tertiary effect is due to throwing 
the whole body backwards and causing injuries/death because of the impact with other 
objects. There is also a possibility of death/injuries due to fragments or debris which is a 
secondary indirect effect. 
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Thermal damages to people caused due to fire heat load are categorized as a first degree 
bum, second degree bum and third degree bum [Wieczorek and Nicholas, 2001]. The 
severity of damage depends on the level of tissue death and the depth of damage. In a 
first degree bum, the epidermis is affected and it is red and painful with no blisters. In a 
second degree bum, the epidermis and part of the dermis layer of the skin are burned; the 
skin is red, blistered, red and painful. A third degree injury bums both the epidermis and 
the dermis layer of the skin and sometimes the severity of the damage affects bones, 
muscles and tendons; the burned parts of the skin appear white and charred with no 
sensation in the area due to the total destruction of nerve endings [ Assael and 
Kakosimos, 20 I 0]. 
Toxic combustion substances such as carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide and unburned 
methane also have adverse effects on exposed people. A low level of carbon monoxide is 
harmful for those suffering from heart diseases (cardiovascular effects). Higher levels of 
carbon monoxide affect the central nervous system, causing vision problems, reducing 
the ability to work/learn, and also causing difficulties in the performance of complex 
tasks. Carbon monoxide at extremely high levels is toxic and may lead to death. Nitrogen 
dioxide at low levels can cause chronic respiratory symptoms such as coughing and 
phlegm. At extremely high levels, nitrogen dioxide is toxic and may cause death. 
Methane is not toxic at low levels, but it is an asphyxiant gas displacing oxygen, and 
causes hypoxia leading to death [Khan and Sadiq, 2005; WHO, 2003; OSHA, 2003] . 
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To quantify the personal damage, the probit function is used where the personal harm 
due to a specific event is expressed as the percentage of people affected in a bounded 
region of interest [TNO, 1989). In this method, the dose is first calculated as a function 
of the heat flux, explosion overpressure or toxic concentration. Then, the probit value is 
obtained as follows: 
Pr =a+ binD 3.1 
where Dis expressed as shown in table 3.6. 
Table 3.6. Definition of D value in pro bit function 
Event D Definition 
t X q4h 
t: exposure time (s) 
Fire 
q: heat flux (W/m2) 
Explosion Po Po: overpressure (Pa) 
C: concentration (ppm) 
Toxic dispersion ext 
t: exposure time (s) 
The values of a and b are available for various damage types in TNO (1989). Finally, the 
probability of damage is calculated through the following expression: 
-![ Pr-5 (IPr-51)] 
p - 2 1 + I Pr - 51 er f .../2 3.2 
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The probit model has commonly been used in impact assessment studies such as Khan 
and Abbasi (1998), Pula et al. (2006) and Pasman and Duxbury (1992) to calculate the 
probability of damage due to fire, explosion and toxic dispersion. 
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Abstract 
Quantification of the fugitive emission rate in an oil and gas facility is an important step 
in risk management. There are several studies conducted by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (USEP A) and American Petroleum Institute (API) 
proposing methods of estimating emission rates and factors. Four major approaches of 
estimating these emissions, in the order of their accuracy, are: average emission factor 
approach, screening ranges emission factor approach, USEP A correlation equations 
approach, and unit-specific correlation equations approach. The focus of this study is to 
optimize the USEP A correlation equations to estimate the emission rate of different units 
in an oil and gas facility. In the developed methodology, the data available from USEPA 
[USEP A, 1995] is used to develop new sets of equations. A comparison between USEP A 
correlation equations and the proposed equations is performed to define the optimum sets 
of equations. It is observed that for pumps, flanges, open-ended lines, and others, the 
* Dadashzadeh M, Khan F, Hawboldt K, and Abbassi R. (20 I 0). Emission factor estimation for oil and 
gas facilities. Journal of Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 89, 295-299. 
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proposed developed equations provides a better estimation of the emission rate, whereas 
for other sources, USEP A equations gives a better estimate of the emission rate. 
Keywords: oil and gas industry, emission factor, linear regression, non-linear 
regression 
4.1 Introduction 
Fugitive emissions are any type of leak from sealed surfaces of equipment from oil and 
gas facilities [USEP A, 2007]. The major fugitive emissions are hydrocarbons; aromatic 
hydrocarbons including benzene, toluene, ethyl-benzene, and xylene; non-aromatic 
hydrocarbons including methane, ethane, propane, butane, pentane, and hexane [API, 
1993]. 
Valves, pump seals, connectors, flanges, and open-ended lines are the main sources of 
equipment leaks in oil and gas facilities while instruments, loading arms, pressure relief 
valves, stuffing boxes, and vents are considered "others" [API, 1993]. 
To estimate the emission, a factor representing the relationship between the emission and 
the activity associated with the release of that particular emission or emission factor, is 
used (Equation 4.1 ). 
E = A X EF X (1 - ER II 00) 4.1 
Where, 
E = emission (mass) 
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A = activity rate (mass, volume, distance, or duration of the activity emitting the 
pollutant) 
EF = emission factor (mass/ mass, volume, distance, or duration of the activity emitting 
the pollutant) 
ER =overall emission reduction efficiency(%) 
Emission factors are represented by units such as the mass of pollutant per unit mass, 
volume, distance, duration of activity, or other aspects associated with the activity of 
concern. 
Emission factors are applied for a variety of situations, such as emission estimates for 
inventories associated with large industries. The inventories are also applicable in 
ambient dispersion modeling and analysis, management methodologies, and screening 
sources where required [USEPA, 201 0). 
Generally, there are four approaches to equipment emission estimation. These 
approaches, in order of increasing the accuracy, are the average emission factor 
approach, screening range approach, EPA correlation approach, and unit-specific 
correlation approach. The first two methods, the average emission factor and the 
screening range approach, estimate emissions by combining the emission factors with 
equipment counts. The EPA correlation factor estimates the emissions using the 
measured concentrations (screening values) of different equipments and correlation 
equations. In the unit-specific correlation approach, the measured screening and leak rate 
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data of a selected set of components of an equipment is used to develop the correlation 
equations. Subsequently, the leak rate is estimated using these correlation equations 
[USEPA, 1995]. 
Studies on emission factors development have been conducted on refineries, gas plants, 
marketing terminal equipments, and oil and gas production facilities. Studies on 
refineries' fugitive emissions were based on equipment leak data collected from 13 
refineries. The collected data has been used to develop average emission factors and 
correlations. The above studies defined the components as valves, pumps, and pressure 
relief valves which operate in gas/vapour, light liquid and heavy liquid services [USEP A, 
1995]. In another study, based on the data screened by EPA and API from six gas plants, 
the average emission factors including emissions of ethane and methane have been 
developed [Dubose et al., 1982]. In API (1993), the data screened from four marketing 
terminals has been used to develop new average emission factors, default zero emission 
factors, and emission correlation equations for the components of petroleum marketing 
terminals. In addition to the above, API (1993) and API (1995) provided two more 
reports, including data from 24 oil and gas production facilities. The services in these 
facilities were gas/vapour, light liquid, and heavy liquid streams in different components 
including connectors, flanges, open-ended lines, pumps, valves, instruments, loading 
arms, pressure relief valves, stuffing boxes, vents, compressors, dump lever arms, 
diaphragms, drains, hatches, meters, and polished rods. The results from these studies 
were used to develop emission correlation equations in two different categories of 
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onshore and offshore oil and gas production facilities (API, 1995; API, 1993]. In the last, 
data from refineries, marketing terminals and oil and gas production facilities was used 
to develop the new correlation equations, which are applicable in the whole petroleum 
industry. New equations are in six different equipment categories: valves, pump seals, 
connectors, flanges, open-ended lines, and others [USEP A, 1995]. 
The focus of this study is to optimize the emission rate estimation with the use of EPA 
correlation equations. The EPA approach of developing correlation equations will be 
outlined and a non-linear regression conducted. In this approach, the parameters for the 
non-linear regression are estimated with the target of minimizing the sum of the squared 
errors. Subsequently, the new approach is applied to a case study and the results are 
compared with those of EPA to optimize the selection of the most appropriate equations. 
4.2 Correlation equation development methodology 
For a particular equipment type, an equation is developed to estimate the leak rate as a 
function of screening value which is the screened concentration of emission from the 
equipment. Compared with two previous methods, this approach is a strong function of 
the screening value, which provides an auditable basis and enhances emission rate 
prediction ability [USEP A, 1995]. 
4.2.1 EPA correlation equation approach 
According to EPA protocol [USEP A, 1995], when developing correlation equations, two 
sets of data are required: 
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• Individual Screening Value (ISV) which is the screened concentration of 
emission from the equipment with unit of ppmv. 
• Emission Leak Rate (kglhr) 
The natural logarithm of both data (screening value (ppmv) and leak rate (kglhr)) is 
applied as these values span several orders of magnitude and are not normally 
distributed. Subsequently, simple linear regression is performed as follows [USEP A, 
1995]: 
yi = ~0 + ~I X Xi 4.2 
Where Yi and Xi are the natural logarithm of the leak rate measured by bagging 
equipment piece i and the natural logarithm of the screening value for equipment piece i, 
respectively. The intercept and the slope of the regression line <Po and ~ 1 ) are calculated 
as explained in Figure 4.1. 
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X;= In (ISV) 
fJ - (XY) X (X)(Y) 
I- X 2 X y 2 J} 
flo = Y - /J1 X U ~c__ _____ ____, 
Y; = In (Leak rate) --+ y 2 = L Y/ / n ~ 
Y= I r; /n r-
Figure 4.1. Application of linear regression with ISV and emission rate 
Finally, equation 4.2 is converted from log-space to arithmetic space as follows: 
LeakRate(kg I hr) = SBCF x Exp({J0 )(1SV )P' 4 .3 
Where, SBCF is a function of the mean square error of the correlation in log-space. The 
equation for this factor is as follows [USEP A, 1995]: 
(m- 1) x T (m- 1)3 x T2 (m- 1)5 x T3 
SBC F = 1 + + + ---::------=------=- ---
m m 2 x 2! x (m + 1) m3 x 3! x (m + 1) x (m + 3) 
+ .... 4.4 
Where: 
when regression performed using base 10 logarithms; 
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T = (MSE/2) when regression performed using naturallogaritluns; 
MSE = mean square error from the regression; 
ln1 0 = naturallogaritlun of 1 0; and 
m = number of data pairs - 1 
4.2.2 Approach used in the current study 
In some cases of nonlinear models, the equation is transformable to a linear model. A 
good example of this situation is the EPA correlation equation format ( Y = a Xb ) where 
by obtaining the natural logaritlun of both sides and converting the model to a linear 
format, the parameters have been estimated as explained in the EPA correlation equation 
approach. The detransformation (equation is transformed back to the aritlunetic space) is 
often applied when the equation is used to estimate the value of one variable (leak rate) 
from the other variable (ISV) [Smith, 1993]. However, through the conversion from 
logaritlunic space to the aritlunetic space, a bias occurs. This bias is due to the 
compression of the largest values in logaritlunic space tending to have less effect than 
small values in estimating the leak rate [Beauchamp and Olson, 1973; Finney, 1941]. 
On the other hand, applying this approach is a useful tool to estimate the initial values of 
the model parameters that are required in non-linear regression analysis [Smyth, 2002]. 
Therefore, the focus of this section is to use the initial values of parameters "a" and "b", 
estimated through EPA correlation equation approach, in order to develop new sets of 
correlation equations with better accuracy. 
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The non-liner approach is applied to the same sets of data as the EPA to develop 
correlation equations [RDCT, 2009]. The methodology is focused to minimize the sum 
of the squared errors estimated by the equation Y = a Xb. This non-linear approach used 
by R software considers the following steps (Figure 4.2): 
• The sets of data are selected as Y (emission rate) and X (screening value). 
• Estimation of the initial values of a and b is an important step as the final 
estimation of two parameters is a strong function of initial estimates. In this case, 
the EPA suggested values are used as initial values. 
• Estimating the sum of the squared errors 
• If I (Yi-axXibi is less than I (Yi-1-axXi-Ib)2 , the parameters a and bare set to ak 
and bk and if it is not, try another values of ak and bk. 
46 
Estimation of ak and bk 
Y: Yi = Leak Ratei 
Yes 
Figure 4.2. Application of non-linear regression with ISV and leak rate 
After applying the non-linear regression analysis to the sets of data, the parameters a and 
b are optimized. 
4.3 Application of the new approach: a case study 
Both methodologies are applied to the sets of data, ISV and emission leak rate available 
from USEP A [USEP A, 1995]. Table 4.1 shows the group of components with the 
number of data available in each group. 
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Table 4.1. Component categories with the number of data [USEPA, 1995] 
.... .. ~-
Compound Category Number of data pairs 
Valves 337 
Pump seals 53 
Connectors 118 
Flanges 56 
Open-Ended lines 141 
Others 70 
In this case study, the data from onshore/offshore oil and gas operations, refineries, and 
marketing terminals are combined. Six different categories are used, as shown in Table 
4.1 . The types of services in all categories include heavy liquid, light liquid, and gas 
services. 
Detailed statistics, such as the sum of squared errors, R2, F-ratio, and L1 Akaike's 
information criterion (t1 AIC), are used to compare the results from the EPA correlation 
equation approach and the non-linear approach used in this paper. 
The sum of squared errors (SS) is estimated as: 
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II 
ss = LO'; - f(X; ))2 4.5 
i= l 
Where, Yi and f(Xi) are observed and predicted values of sample i, respectively. This 
parameter is an unexplained variation of the model. In the other words, the smaller the 
SS estimated with a regression model, the better the model fits the sets of data 
[Berthouex Brown, 2002]. 
The R2 value is the parameter for the best fit of nonlinear regressions estimated as 
follows [GPSI, 2007]: 
2 ss,.eg 
R =I--- 4.6 
SS101 
Where, SSreg is the sum of the squares of distances of the points from the best fit of curve 
determined by non-linear regression and SS101 is the sum of the squares of distances of 
the points from a horizontal line through the mean of all y values. Obtaining a higher 
value of R2 for a model does not necessarily mean the model shows a good estimation of 
all data points from the variables. As an example, if there are n data points and also n 
parameters, then the value of R2 will be 1. However, adding new data points to such a 
model will strongly affect R2 value. To overcome this, the R2 value is adjusted as follows 
[Mendenhall and Sincich, 1993]: 
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2 n - 1 (SSreg) Ra = 1- X --
n - (p + 1) sstot 4.7 
Where n is the number of data points and p is the number of parameters. Compared to 
R 2, R ; is affected by both the sample size and the number of parameters in the model 
[Mendenhall and Sincich, 1993]. 
Rather than conducting a hypothesis test on each parameter individually (t test), it is 
more appropriate to use a global test applicable to all parameters. Thus, the F test is a 
more useful approach to test the utility of the non-linear regression model [Mendenhall 
and Sincich, 1993]. The F ratio is as follows: 
( SSIOI - ssreg ) I p F = -----"--- 4.8 
SS101 /[ n- (p + 1)] 
The F ratio explains the variability. Thus, if the model meets the following condition: 
F-ratio > F-critical 4.9 
The following null hypothesis is rejected: 
Ho : ~ t = ~2 = ... = ~P = 0 4.10 
F-critical is Fa, numerator ct.f. , denominator ct.r., where the numerator d.f. is the number of 
parameters (k), denominator d.f. is n-(k+ 1 ), a is the rejection region (0.05 in this study), 
and ~ represents the parameters. In other words, F-critical is the minimum value ofF-
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ratio at which the null hypothesis could be rejected. Therefore, the larger F value shows 
the more usefulness of the model [Mendenhall and Sincich, 1993]. 
11 Akaike's information criterion (11 AIC) is the value which can be estimated as follows: 
11 AIC = p x Ln(ss EPA) 
SS,ew 
4.11 
Where, SSEPA is the sum of squared errors from the EPA approach and SSnew is the sum 
of squared errors from the new regression approach. When 11 AIC is more than I, it 
shows that the non-linear model is a better choice. According to [Burnham and 
Anderson, 2002], when 11 AIC IS more than 10, the non-linear equation is strongly 
recommended. 
4.4 Results and discussion 
Table 4.2 shows the equations provided through the application of both approaches; EPA 
correlation equation approach and the proposed approach. 
51 
Table 4.2. Comparison of the equations developed by EPA and non-linear approach 
Component type Approach Equation F Ratio FCritical Sum of squared errors R2 Ra2 t.AIC 
EPA LR = 2.29 X 10 6 X /SV 0·746 56 3.87 3.46E-03 0.142 0.139 
Valves 6 
Proposed LR = 1.78 x 10 6 X ISV0·747 63 3.87 3.40E-03 0.158 0.157 
EPA LR = 5.03 x 10 5 x /SV0·6 10 0 4.03 7.48E-03 0 0 
Pump seals 14 
Proposed LR = 5.53 X 10 4 X /SV0·2906 6 4.03 5.70E-03 0.107 0.090 
EPA LR = 1.53 X 10 6 X /SV 0·7 35 5 3.94 2.38E-02 0.039 0.031 
Connectors 10 
Proposed LR = 5.62 X 10 6 X /SV0•7 54 16 3.94 2.18E-02 0.120 0.112 
EPA LR = 4.61 X 10 6 X ISV0·703 0 4 .03 9 .41 E-05 0 0 
Flanges 37 
Proposed LR = 5.52 X 10 5 x /SV0·3 53 13 4.03 4.87E-05 0.198 0 .184 
Open-ended EPA LR = 2.20 x 10 
6 x ISV0·704 2 3.9 1 4.58E-03 0.0 14 0.007 
3 lines 
Proposed LR = 9.93 X 10-5 X /SV0·347 5 3.9 1 4.49E-03 0.032 0.025 
EPA LR = 1.36 X 10 5 X /SV05 89 0 3.98 9.79E-05 0 0 
Others 2 1 
Proposed LR = 7.72 x 10 5 X /SV0·320 12 3.98 7.29E-05 0.148 0 .136 
It is evident from F-ratio, compared to F-critical, that for the pumps, flanges, and others 
categories the non-linear approach demonstrates better estimations of emission rate. 
Also, in open-ended lines, the F-ratio obtained for the EPA equation is less than F-
critical, thus confirming the acceptance of the null hypothesis. In other words, the new 
equation represents a better estimation. In other categories, the F-ratio of both 
approaches are almost the same. 
Comparing the sum of squared errors demonstrates those obtained through non-linear 
approach are less than those of EPA approach. In pumps, flanges, and others categories 
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where the sum of squared errors with non-linear approach are several times lower than 
those of EPA, the non-linear equations are proposed. 
Similar to the F-ratio results, in pumps, flanges, and others categories, R ; is zero. In 
connectors and open-ended lines, R ; is several times higher than those of EPA while 
R ; for valves is similar in both approaches. Thus, the non-linear equations are proposed 
for the categories of pumps, connectors, flanges, open-ended lines, and others. 
The ~ AIC s obtained for the pump seals, connectors, flanges, and others are equal or 
higher than 10, confirming the better estimation of emission rate by applying the non-
linear equations [Burnham and Anderson, 2002]. 
The statistical analysis of both approaches confirms that with the existence of new sets of 
data (ISV and emission rate), the non-linear approach is more accurate to develop the 
correlation equations. 
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Figures 4.3 to 4.5 show the trends for the actual data, EPA equations' estimate, and also 
the new equation estimate of emission leak rate. Compared with the trend of actual data, 
both approaches show almost the same trend at lower ISV points. However, as the ISV 
values increase, the proposed equations show a better fit to the trend compared to EPA 
proposed methodology, which shows an overestimation. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Applying a non-linear regression to the screenmg values and leak rate, new sets of 
emission correlation equations for different equipment categories were developed. The 
purpose of developing such equations was to better estimate the emission rate based on 
the screening value for different series of valves, pump seals, connectors, flanges, open-
ended lines, and others associated with oil and gas operations. Comparing the results 
estimated by EPA correlation equations with the proposed model show a better 
estimation of emission rate in pump seals, connectors, open-ended lines, and others. 
Finally, it is observed as new data gets available for different components the new 
approach is a better method of revising correlation equations as compared to EPA. The 
release rate equations are used to estimate concentration profile of the chemicals in and 
around the facility. The concentration profile is used to assessment environmental impact 
and associated risk. Precise estimation of the emission rate helps to overcome uncertainty 
associated with environmental impact and risk assessment. This paper would help 
readers to understand the methodology and choose better equations to estimate emission 
rate and assess associated risk. 
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5 Explosion modeling and analysis of BP deepwater horizon accident* 
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The BP Deepwater Horizon blowout not only resulted in an oil release over several 
months but also caused an explosion topside which took 11 lives. The details of the 
causes of the accident and a computational fluid dynamics (CFDs) modeling of the 
dispersion of flammable gas was given in the BP investigation report [BP, 201 0]. 
However, the explosion consequence was not studied in the BP report. In this study, a 
CFD model was used to simulate the dispersion of flammable gas and integrated with the 
explosion consequences. The simulation includes modeling of the dispersion of the 
vapour cloud in the first section and modeling the resulting explosion based on the 
dispersion results. Through the modeling, it was determined that the overpressure in the 
engine room and in highly congested areas of the platform are 1. 7 (bar) and 0.8 (bar), 
respectively. The model also identified overpressure regions on the platform and the 
effect of the area's congestion on overpressure intensity: lower overpressure in lower 
congested areas and higher overpressure in higher congested/confined areas. 
* Dadashzadeh M, Abbassi R., Khan F, and Hawboldt K. (201 3). Explosion Modeling and Analysis of BP Deepwater 
Horizon Accident. Journal of Safety Science, 57, 150- 160. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Increasing energy demand is driving offshore exploration to more remote, deeper, and 
harsh environments and as a result safety and accident control is becoming increasingly 
challenging. One of the key areas of concern is vapour cloud explosions (VCE) which 
occur due to the release of flammable gases and ignition. Thus, the understanding of the 
consequences of a VCE and using a safety design based on the consequences could 
prevent and/or mitigate accidents. 
5.1.1 Important vapour cloud explosion accidents 
In June 1974, an explosion occurred in the Nypro plant at Flixborough resulting in 28 
fatalities and 36 injuries. The explosion brought severe damage to the plant, while 
damage to the surrounding area was also significant. There was scattered debris as far as 
32 km from the location of the plant. The main cause of the accident was the release of 
cyclohexane at 150 oc and a pressure of 1 MPa in the plant area due to the failure of one 
of the pipes between five interconnected oxidation vessels. The vapour cloud formed was 
then mixed with the air. Being in a flammable range, the vapour cloud was ignited 
through a source of ignition which was most likely the reformer furnace of the nearby 
hydrogen plant. Consequently, a vapour cloud explosion (VCE) occurred in the plant 
[Sadee and Samuels, 1977]. The highly destructive overpressure was caused due to the 
highly congested/confined area of the plant [Venart, 2007]. A CFD simulation of the 
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Flixborough incident was performed and results indicate that while the maximum 
overpressure of 15 bar was approached, the ignition location had no significant effect on 
the magnitude of the maximum overpressure [H0iset et al., 2000]. The magnitude was 
calculated to be equal to the detonation of 16 tons of TNT with an overpressure 
distribution radius of over 3 km [Sadee and Samuels, 1977]. 
In 1988, the Piper Alpha platform, located in the North Sea, experienced an explosion 
causing 165 deaths and total destruction of the platform. Investigations revealed the 
release of light hydrocarbons (condensate propane, butane, and pentane) occurred due to 
the restart of a pump which was out of service for maintenance. A relief valve (RV) was 
also replaced by a blank on the piping flange for the service. Then, due to the restart of 
the pump, with no knowledge of the removal of the RV, the flange leaked releasing 
hydrocarbon gases. The subsequent presence of an ignition source caused the explosion 
[CCPS, 2005]. Investigation reports revealed that the most likely sources of ignition were 
hot surfaces, broken light fittings, electrostatic sparks, and electric motors. Through the 
propagation of the fire to module B, the rupture of the B/C firewall caused the breaking of 
a pipe. Consequently, a large amount of crude oil was leaked in module B causing a 
fireball in this module. The fire then reached 1200 barrels of fuel stored on the deck 
above modules B and C while it was spreading back to module C. Thus, the second 
explosion occurred. The heat load in module B also caused the rupture of the riser 
followed by an impinging jet fire under the platform [Pate-Conell, 1993]. 
In October 1989, an explosion occurred at the Houston chemical complex of Philips 
Company, Pasadena, Texas. The complex was a polyethylene plant, and the accident was 
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caused through the release of about 39,000 kg of flammable vapour composed of 
ethylene, isobutene, hexane, and hydrogen. Due to the high pressure and temperature in 
the process, the flammable vapour cloud formed very fast, followed by ignition in less 
than 2 minutes after the release [Betha, 1996]. The actual source of ignition was 
unknown. However, there were several potential sources of ignition such as a small diesel 
crane used by a maintenance crew, an operating forklift, a gas-fired catalyst activator with 
an open flame, welding and cutting operations, vehicles parked near the polyethylene 
plant office building, and ordinary electrical gear in the control building and the finishing 
building. Around 90 seconds after the release, the flammable vapour was ignited followed 
by an explosion. Then, the flame reached two 20,000 gallon isobutene storage tanks and 
the second explosion occurred. There was also another polyethylene plant reactor exposed 
to the consequent fire which made the third explosion [OSHA, 1990]. 
In September 1997, an explosion occurred in a Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) storage 
vessel at the refinery of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) in 
Vishakhapatnam, India; it resulted in 60 deaths and over $15 million damage. The cause 
of the accident was a leak from a corroded pipeline around a storage tank. The resulting 
vapour cloud formed a continuous fire that led to the subsequent explosion. The major 
reasons for the incident were that no decisive steps were taken during the period of the 
leak occurrence (1 hour 25 minutes), the LPG was getting unloaded without a proper 
safety system, there was no management plan, and no response to the warning signals 
[Khan and Abbasi, 1999]. 
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In March 2001, an accident occurred on the Petrobras platform 36, located offshore from 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The accident caused the loss of 11 lives. The platform sank after 
five days [USEP A, 2001]. Investigation showed the accident was started by the rupture of 
an Emergency Drain Tank (EDT) in the starboard aft column because of excessive 
overpressure. Consequently, the damage to the equipment led to the release of water, oil, 
and gas on the platform. Then, due to an ignition of dispersed gas through an unknown 
source of ignition, a major explosion occurred which resulted in a massive destruction of 
the platform [Barusco, 2002]. 
In March 2005 at BP's Texas City refinery an explosion resulted in 15 lives lost and 180 
injuries. In this accident, a flammable liquid hydrocarbon was released to the ground 
around a drum stack. Then, the flammable liquid was vapourized, forming a vapour cloud 
at the top of the liquid pool. Atmospheric wind pushed the vapours and droplets 
downwind, causing them to mix with air. Some portions of the vapour cloud also went 
upwind and crosswind. The vapour cloud then reached an ignition source which was most 
likely an idling pickup truck near the area. The truck caught fire, followed by a vapour 
cloud explosion (VCE). Rather than the blast pressure causing a disaster, the flame-front 
through the VCE reached the accumulated vapour above the liquid pool and caused a pool 
fire [Kalantamia et al., 2010; Khan and Amyotte, 2007; CSB, 2007]. According to 
Broadribb [Broadribb, 2006], the failure to control the liquid which escaped from the 
tower and the failure to respond appropriately resulted in the explosion. The severity of 
the incident was compounded by the presence of people in the vicinity of the release and 
the lack of rigour in safety management. 
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The previous accidents could have been minimized in terms of financial and human loss 
through better prediction of the dispersion of the flammable gases and resulting 
overpressure. With this information mitigation measures could be put in place and better 
safety management plans (e.g. "safe" areas) developed. The BP Deepwater Horizon 
accident in April 2010 is another, more recent example. Using FLACS CFD modeling, 
BP conducted a gas dispersion analysis to simulate the flammable concentration of the 
released hydrocarbons on the platform [BP, 201 0]. However, the dispersion of the gas 
was only the initial step which resulted in the explosion. 
This study focuses on integrating dispersion of flammable hydrocarbon release and 
explosion consequences using the FLACS model. While the dispersion modelling 
predicts cloud behaviour, the inclusion in the model of the resulting explosion and 
overpressure predictions can minimize damage and losses by identifying hazardous areas 
and using the information to optimize platform design. 
5.2 Vapour cloud explosion modeling 
The extent of damage from the release of flammable gases is in part a function of the 
dispersion of the cloud. If there is no immediate ignition, the flammable vapour is 
dispersed through structure geometry and ventilation systems and ignition may be 
delayed. Ignition and resulting vapour cloud explosion (VCE) occur if the flammability 
limits of the gas are met (based on gas composition) and an ignition source with enough 
energy is presented [Assael and Kakosimos, 2010]. 
0.21 
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A VCE is influenced by several factors that have been analyzed in vanous studies 
[Mannan, 2005; Prugh, 1987]. In general, the ignition probability increases with the size 
of the vapour cloud. The explosion efficiency and impact are affected by the turbulent 
mixing of vapour and air and the location of ignition sources [Crowl and Louvar, 2001]. 
When an explosion occurs, there is a transient air pressure greater than the surrounding 
atmospheric pressure referred to as overpressure. During such a phenomenon, the gas 
expands rapidly due to the energy released and the surrounding gas is forced back, 
initiating a pressure wave that moves rapidly from the blast source. The propagation of a 
pressure wave in air, or blast wave, is the source of most of the damage caused by 
explosions. The blast is the composite of the pressure wave, the change in overpressure 
during the period of explosion, and subsequent wind. Table 5.1 outlines damages from 
various overpressure intensities. The dispersion and explosion are complex transport 
phenomena and tools such as computational fluid dynamic models are typically used to 
simulate incidents. 
Table 5.1. Damage estimates for common structures based on overpressure [Crowl and Louvar, 
2001) 
Heavy machines (3000 lb) in industrial building suffer little damage; steel frame 
uildings distort and pull away from foundations 
0.21-0.28 Frameless, self-framing steel panel buildings demolished; rupture of oil storage 
tanks 
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0.34 
Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptures 
ooden utility poles snap; tall hydraulic presses ( 40,000 lb) in buildings slightly 
damaged 
0.34-0.48 early complete destruction of houses 
0.48 Loaded train wagons overturned 
0.48-0.55 Brick panels, 8-12 in. thick, not reinforced, fail by shearing or flexure 
0.62 
0.69 
5.2.1 
Loaded train boxcars completely demolished 
Probable total destruction of buildings; heavy machine tools (7000 lb) moved and 
adly damaged; very heavy machine tools (12,000 lb) survive 
CFD modeling 
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFDs) are able to model complex transport phenomena 
(momentum, mass and heat) in complicated flow geometries. The level of 
congestion/confinement in an industrial facility is an important parameter in VCE 
phenomena. The Flame Acceleration Simulator (FLACS) is a general purpose CFD 
model that is used in offshore/onshore studies of hydrocarbon dispersion and explosion 
modeling [Berget a!., 2000; Moros eta!., 1996; Qiao and Zhang, 2010; Wingerden and 
Salvesen, 1995]. 
In the current study, FLACS CFD software [GEXCON, 2010] was used to model the 
dispersion and explosion of the flammable vapour cloud. Using a finite volume method in 
a Cartesian grid, the concentration equations of mass, momentum, and enthalpy are 
solved in FLACS. Mixture fraction and mass fraction equations are also solved in FLACS 
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and the combustion model is used to close the set of equations. For turbulence, FLACS 
uses a Reynold-averaged Navier-Stokes (RANS) approach based on the standard k-£ 
model to close the equations. As obstacles with small details play a significant role during 
dispersion and explosions, the representation of such details is a key aspect of modeling. 
There is however a balance between the need to represent geometric details and the 
resulting increase in computational time. In order to satisfy these issues, a distributed 
porosity concept is used and obstacles are represented by area and volume porosity 
[Hanna et al., 2004; Launder and Splading, 1974]. 
There are two different modes for the combustion of gaseous fuel in air. One is where 
fuel and oxygen are mixed during the combustion process when the fire occurs. The other 
one is where the fuel and air are premixed and the combustion occurs when the fuel 
concentration is within the flammability limit. A vapour cloud explosion is initiated with 
the ignition of a premixed cloud of fuel and oxidants. Then, the premixed vapour will 
bum with a laminar burning velocity in a steady non-turbulent situation which may 
escalate to an explosion with turbulent burning velocity [Bjerketvedt, 1997]. 
The combustion model of a premixed combustion, like a vapour cloud explosion, is 
divided into two major parts; localizing the reaction zone (flame model); and conversion 
of reactants at a similar rate to what happens in a real explosion (Burning velocity rate). 
Modeling the flame is essential in a combustion model due to the thin premixed flame in 
the reaction zone compared to grid resolution. FLACS uses ~ flame model [Arntzen, 
1998] in order to model the flame. In ~ flame model, the reaction zone is thickened by 
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increasing the diffusion with a factor ~ and decreasing the reaction rate with a factor 11~. 
There are three different modes of burning velocity from the beginning of the ignition up 
to the escalation to an explosion. These are laminar burning, when the flame is smooth 
and governed by molecular diffusion, and quasi-laminar, when there is wrinkling of the 
flame due to instabilities and the turbulent regime, after a transition period. FLACS 
calculates the burning velocity (Su) as Su=Max (SqL, ST). Turbulent burning velocity (ST) 
is calculated through a developed correlation [Bray, 1990] while quasi-laminar burning 
velocity is dependent on laminar burning velocity, the flame radius, and the fuel 
dependent constant [Arntzen, 1998]. 
Using several grid cells is the disadvantage of the ~ flame model. As an alternative, the 
Simple Line Interface Calculation (SLIC) was introduced by Arntzen (1998) in a 2D 
version of FLACS. In 3D, the SLIC is modified to SIF (Simple Interface Flame) as the 
flame is a surface in 30 compared to a line in 2D. In this model, the reactants and 
products are compounds of the gas while the flame is the interface between these two. 
Thus, the flame separates the zone into reactants and products. The reactants then convert 
to the products at a rate depending on burning velocity and flame area. The SIF algorithm 
starts with the update and calculation of values on the boundaries. Then, with a rate 
depending on flame area and burning velocity, reactants are converted to products 
resulting in an increase in the mass fraction of products. Using calculated pressures from 
previous steps, a velocity field is estimated using the momentum equation. In this step, ~ 
flame model uses a pressure correction routine for compressible flows to satisfy the 
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continuity equation. However, in a reactive flow, the equation of state is not satisfied with 
the normal pressure correction routine. Thus, SIF uses a modified pressure correction 
routine to satisfy the equation of state in a reactive flow [Arntzen, 1998]. 
Compared to other dispersion models, FLACS has some advantages; primarily it gives 
reasonably good predictions that have been validated for different scenarios. The 
distributed porosity concept is another key advantage as it results in simulations of 
dispersion and explosion in large and complex facilities which are computationally faster 
than other conventional models. Additionally, the well-established turbulence model (k-£) 
with fewer equations and constants, compared to other alternative models, is a key 
advantage. The k-£ model has some shortcomings such as the over prediction of 
turbulence intensities in the stagnation region of impinging jets. This causes the over 
prediction of wall heat transfer and poor prediction of boundary layers around bluff 
bodies. Lack of predicting the secondary swirling flows in non-circular ducks is another 
drawback in k-£ model which causes the faster spreading of the plane two-dimensional 
jets than that of round jets while in fact they are slower. Regardless of such shortcomings, 
the k -£ model is widely used in CFD studies [HSE, 201 0]. 
The impact of grating between lower and upper process decks, different configuration of 
barrier walls, and different configuration of separation gaps in risk reduction have been 
studied in a floating production storage and oftloading (FPSO) platform using the FLACS 
CFD code [Berg et al., 2000]. In another study, the methodologies of estimating the 
maximum achievable gas cloud for different releases, wind and ventilation conditions, 
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and probabilities of explosions were outlined through the application of the FLACS code 
[Moros et al., 1996]. In a study by Wingerden and Salvesen (1995), the damage as a result 
of a VCE in a naphtha cracker installation was simulated with FLACS. The trends 
between the actual explosion and the CFD model were similar. However, the explosion 
simulation in this study was sensitive to the characteristics of the flammable cloud and 
therefore a more realistic model of the dispersion process of the flammable vapour is 
critical. There was also a difference between the estimated overpressure from 
stoichiometric to excess ratio [Wingerden and Salvesen, 1995]. In a related study, FLACS 
was used to develop the potential gas build-up due to an accidental gas release and the 
resulting potential overpressure caused by VCE in offshore/onshore oil and gas 
production facilities [Qiao and Zhang, 201 0]. 
The FLACS CFD code has been validated against a range of experiments through several 
studies [Middha et al., 201 0; Davis et al. , 201 0]. Using the FLACS CFD code, a study 
was performed using simulations to predict the results of combined release and ignition 
scenarios. The simulation results were compared to the results achieved through the 
experiments carried out with the ignition of vertically upward hydrogen releases, different 
release rates, and different geometry configurations. There was good correlation between 
the simulated dispersion results and the experimental gas concentrations. In terms of 
explosion overpressure, the pressure levels obtained through the simulation results were 
similar to those of experiments, though the ignition locations were somewhat different in 
CFD simulation [Middha et al., 201 0]. Another study was conducted to simulate the 
Buncefield Oil Storage Depot incident (2005). The FLACS CFD code was used to model 
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the geometry of the Buncefield site. There were also sets of experiments to validate the 
simulation results. The correlation between the FLACS simulation results and the 
observed blast damage compared well with experimental results [Davis et al., 201 0]. 
In this study the BP Deepwater Horizon gas release, dispersion, and explosion are 
modelled. After a brief description of the main causes of the accident, a description of the 
CFD tool FLACS is described. In order to simulate explosion, the dispersion analysis is 
essential. Therefore, the first section of the modeling focuses on simulation of the 
dispersion of the flammable vapour cloud using the BP reported data [BP, 2010]. In the 
second section, the dispersion results are used in the FLACS explosion simulation to 
predict the overpressure caused by the explosion. 
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Figure 5.1. The required steps for the CFD modeling of vapour cloud dispersion/explosion 
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Figure 5.1 outlines the steps in the CFD modeling of the vapour cloud dispersion and 
explosion. Based on the construction plans/data, the geometry of the simulation is built 
followed by the input of simulation time, ventilation and wind conditions, boundary 
conditions, leak rates and their locations. The simulation volume and the dimensions of 
the grids are defined based on grid refinement for specific points such as leak positions. 
The dispersion model is then run and based on the results a sensitivity analysis is used to 
define the optimum size of grids. Based on these results the explosion simulation is run 
after adding the required changes in the geometry. The ignition time and location are 
selected followed by the explosion simulation. There will also be a sensitivity analysis 
after explosion modeling to make the simulation mesh independent. 
5.2.1.1 The history of BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig 
Macondo well is located in Mississippi Canyon Block 252, 48 miles from the shoreline; 
114 miles from the shipping supply point of Port Fourchon, Louisiana; and 154 miles 
from the Houma, Louisiana helicopter base (Figure 5.2). 
1 
I . ·' 
Figure 5.2. Geographic location of the well [BP, 2010] 
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Exploratory drilling initially began with Transocean's semi-submersible Marianas on 
October 2009. On February 2010, the semi-submersible Marianas was replaced by 
Transocean's Deepwater Horizon. On April 2010, the well's final depth of 18,360 ft was 
approached and well logging, cleanout, and open hull verification was conducted [BP, 
2010]. 
5.2.1.1.1 Accident description 
On the evening of April 20, 2010, a hydrocarbon release from the Macando well onto the 
platform resulted in an explosion and fire on the rig. Eleven people lost their lives, while 
17 others were injured. The fire continued for 36 hours until the rig sank. The BP 
investigation team provided an accident investigation report based on partial real time 
data from the rig, documents from the well's development and construction, witness 
interviews and also information provided by other companies including Transocean, 
Halliburton and Cameron. According to the BP report [BP, 2010], there was a well 
integrity failure resulting in a loss of hydrostatic control of the rig. Failure to control the 
flow from the well with the Blowout Preventer (BOP) resulted in the release of 
hydrocarbons, followed by the subsequent ignition. After the initial explosion, the failure 
of the BOP emergency functions did not allow the well to be sealed. 
Applying fault tree analysis, the BP investigation team defined eight major key findings 
related to the cause of the accident as follows: 
• Failure of the annulus cement barrier to isolate hydrocarbons 
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• Failure of shoe track barriers to isolate the hydrocarbons 
• Failure to establish the well integrity 
• Failure to observe the influx ofhydrocarbons into the riser 
• Failure of well control response actions 
• Venting of the gas diverted from the mud gas separator to the rig 
• Failure of fire and gas systems to prevent the ignition 
• Failure of the Blowout Prevention (BOP) mode to seal the well after the initial 
explosion 
5.2.1.1.2 BP investigation report: vapour cloud dispersion 
Using FLACS, Baker Engineering and Risk (BakerRisk) performed a flammable gas 
dispersion analysis of the accident. According to the BP, the most important release 
location points were as follows: 
• Riser bore at the drill floor 
• Mud gas separator vent at the top of the rig 
• Mud Gas Seperator (MGS) rupture disk/Diverter outlet 
• Slip joint below the moon pool 
• Mud processing 
A simplified geometry of the Deepwater Horizon was built in FLACS pre-processor 
(CASD). The key building/structures included in the simplified geometry were the hull, 
the main deck structure, the key buildings around the drill floor, the helideck, the catwalk 
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aft of the drill floor, the partial walls around the drill floor, the bottle rack forward of the 
drill floor, a simplified representation of the drilling pipe and risers on the platform, and 
a simplified representation of the derrick. 
The released gas composition is outlined in Table 5.2, and the wind was set at the speed 
of2 m/s from port to starboard based on the information provided by BP. 
Table 5.2. Simplified gas composition for FLACS analysis [BP, 2010) 
.. , ....... ;, 
Component, Symbo Concentration (% 
. ~. .~ 
Carbon Dioxide C02 0.84 
Methane CH4 57.18 
Ethane C2H6 5.53 
Propane C3Hs 3.85 
Butane C4H10 2.60 
Pentane CsH12 1.62 
Hexane C6HI4 1.16 
Heptane C7HI6 1.68 
n-Octane CsH1s 1.81 
n-Nonane C9H2o 1.33 
n-Decane CIOH22 22.38 
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As the engme rooms were the most probable ignition areas, the flammable gas 
concentration at the engine rooms' ventilation inlets are key monitoring points. General 
ventilation conditions for different areas of the oil rig were set by leak points in the 
FLACS geometry. Additionally, there were six extra monitor points to observe the 
flammable gas concentration in the ventilation inlets of engine rooms 1 through 6. 
As the dispersion results show, a flammable gas cloud could develop in the moon pool 
and BOP house, on the drill floor, and on the vast majority of the main deck. In the 
engine room area, critical due to the probability of ignition occurrence, the formation of 
the flammable vapour cloud in engine rooms #3 through #4 occurred [BP, 2010]. 
5.2.1.2 CFD-based modeling of BP Deepwater Horizon explosion: application of 
FLACS as a validated CFD tool 
5.2.1.2.1 Scenario definition 
The geometry, wind condition, gas composition and ventilation system are as outlined in 
Figure 5.3. The geometry details were extracted from recent BP investigation report [BP, 
201 0]. However, due to the high concentration of the gas at the ventilation inlets of the 
engine rooms, instead of two scenarios, three possible scenarios were defined in the 
explosion section. In the first scenario, the dispersion simulation was performed with non-
operating ventilation systems at the engine rooms' ventilation inlets. In the second, an 
operating ventilation system was given. The difference between the concentrations of gas 
from the scenarios was assumed to be the mixture ratio that entered the engine rooms. In 
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the third scenario (explosion scenario), engine rooms 1 through 6 were created in the 
second deck of the platform. The dispersion simulation in the later scenario was defined 
as the main scenario for the explosion. 
Table 5.3. Time dependent release points for scenario A [BP, 2010] 
. 
" .! ,.,,.,-:~, c;:~~~e;"': , Ill-, Time at Phase Flowrate over I ~ .i. Phase I\ Start of!': [.. fi No. Duratio~~; ~ ~~-'::. phas ) l r~ Path of'gas release. :: t· l •c, Phase (min.) I , 1 .• (MMSCF/d)~,::: • >. -t ,,.,;,!,_; , . 
1 21:40:30 0.5 0-10 Mud System 
2 21:41 :00 0.5 10-50 Mud System 
50-160 Mud System 
3 21:41:30 0.5 
0-40 MGS Vent 
160 Mud System 
4 21:42:30 0.5 40-20 MGS Vent 
150-75 Riser 
160-50 Mud System 
5 2 1:42:30 1 20 MGS Vent 
75-30 Riser 
50 Mud System 
6 21:43 :30 0.5 20-40 MGS Vent 
30-40 Riser 
50-320 Mud System 
7 21:44:00 0.6 f:l0-240 MGS Vent 
f40-1 80 Riser 
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Time at. 
' 
Phase- Flowrate over 
'C' '--, ,..,.,;,·r· -r''!>. 
· '{!l'.•~:Yi -~·~ 
Phase 1: Start of Duratio '/_:.p phase- ' ~ ': Path of gas release 'fi_·; No. :1· Phase (min.) - ~S~F/d) ._. ·. 
.,:- ·, ,~ •• r '~ ·>.r ·-"" 
320-100 Mud System 
8 21:44:36 1.4 240-60 MGS Vent 
160-50 Riser 
100-10 Mud System 
9 21 :46:00 3 60-5 MGS Vent 
50-2 Riser 
The simulation volume was assumed to be 116mx71mx104m and the grid size was set as 
1 (m) (obtained through sensitivity analysis). There were also some grid refinements 
around the leak areas and some ventilation points. The time of simulation was assumed to 
be 570 seconds, while the first 60 seconds were the start up period where only the 
ventilation points were in operation. The release of flammable gas started after 60 
seconds. The leaks were time dependent during the time of simulation as outlined in 
Table 5.3. 
In order to control the time steps, CFLC and CFL V numbers of 5 and 0.5 were selected, 
respectively. CFLC and CFLV are Courant-Friedrich-Levy numbers based on the sound 
velocity and the fluid flow velocity, respectively. The CFLC and CFLV control the sound 
waves and the fluid flow propagation distance in each time step, which is the average 
control volume length multiplied by the value of CFLC and CFL V. As an example, by 
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defining a CFLC value of 5 and a CFL V value of 0.5, the pressure will propagate 5 cells 
while the fluid flow propagates 0.5 cells in each time step [GEXCON, 2010]. The CFLC 
and CFLV numbers determined were optimized to guarantee convergence. Figure 5.2 
outlines the geometry based on the data available in BP's investigation report for this 
modeling scenario. 
Figure 5.3. BP Deepwater Horizon geometry used for dispersion/explosion simulation 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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After the dispersion simulation, some geometry details were changed in order to initiate 
the explosion simulation of the flammable vapour cloud which was the focus of this 
study. In order to be flammable, the fuel cloud formed through the dispersion simulation 
should be in the flammable limit. Based on the gas composition (Table 5.2), the gas 
mixture has a Low Flammable Limit (LFL) of 0.02 and an Upper Flammable Limit 
(UFL) of 0.12. The flammable cloud then was used in explosion simulation. The 
maximum gas concentration was observed after 320 seconds and set as the time of 
ignition. The ignition location was set in engine room 6 where the highest concentration 
of flammable gas was observed. After 320 seconds, the simulation was re-started to 
observe the overpressure caused by the ignition. Figure 5.4 illustrates the location of 
engine rooms under the first deck of the second floor. 
Figure 5.4. Second deck, configuration of engine rooms #1 to #6 
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Highly congested areas result in turbulence generation. Consequently, the combustion 
rate is enhanced leading to higher overpressure. Hence, the congestion parameter is an 
important factor in complex geometry which is calculated through dividing the total 
length (m) of all items on the main deck (cylinders and boxes) by the total volume (m3) 
of the area of interest. Extracting the total length of cylinders and boxes on the main 
deck, the congestion parameter of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig was estimated to be 
0.48 (m/m3) which is categorized as a low congestion level [Huser et al., 2009]. 
5.3 Results and discussion 
In section 5.3.1, the flammable gas concentration in different locations of the platform is 
presented and discussed. There is also a comparison between the dispersion results 
achieved through the current study and those of the BP investigation report. In section 
5.3.2, the explosion overpressure results, which is the contribution of the current study, is 
presented and discussed. 
5.3.1 Dispersion 
Monitor points 71 and 72 in engine rooms #5 and #6 give the gas concentration at engine 
room ventilation inlets for Scenario 1 (Figure 5.5). FUEL in Figure 5.5 and 5.6 stands for 
the mass fraction of fuel in the mixture of fuel, air, and combustion products. The gas 
concentration starts to increase after 60 seconds when the first leak points occur. At 120 
seconds, the first peak point of 24% is approached. There is a sharp decrease to 3% after 
the first peak point due to the decrease in gas released from the peak points. 
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Figure 5.5. Gas concentration at engine rooms' ventilation inlets with no operating ventilation 
system 
The second peak point occurs after 320 seconds of simulation when all leak points are 
released with their highest leak rate. There is a gradual decrease over 250 seconds to 
around 1% due to the gradual decrease of leak rates from sources. The higher gas 
concentration for engine rooms 5 and 6 compared to other rooms could be due to their 
closer proximity to the mud pit exhaust. The direction of wind, from port to starboard (the 
side where engine room 6 is located) of the platform could be another reason for higher 
gas concentration at these points. 
Figure 5.6 outlines the gas concentration at the same inlets for Scenario 2. Through the 
extraction of data from both simulation results, the average gas concentration (in air) 
entering the engine rooms was estimated to be 7.5 %. Thus, in the third scenario the 6 
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leak points had the same leak rate as ventilation inlets; however, the composition of7.5% 
gas was added into the engine rooms. 
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Figure 5.6. Gas concentration at engine rooms' ventilation inlets with operating ventilation system 
Figure 5.7 shows the gas concentration released to the platform after 320 seconds when 
the maximum gas released was observed through the dispersion simulation. Due to the 
direction of wind and also ventilation, the gas concentrations at engine rooms 5 and 6 and 
also the starboard side of the platform were close to the flammable range for this gas 
composition (0.02 to 0.12). The gas released from engine rooms 5 and 6 also affect the 
high concentration of gas in starboard area. 
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Figure 5.7. Gas concentration at engine rooms' ventilation inlets 
5.3.1.1 Comparison with BP dispersion results 
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According to the BP investigation report [BP, 201 0], approximately 300 seconds after 
the start of release, the fuel concentration at supply air intakes of engine rooms #5 and #6 
was over 20%. In this study the fuel concentrations were 21% and 15% at the same time 
for engine rooms 5 and 6 respectively. However, at approximately 120 seconds after the 
start of release, the BP investigation report indicates a fuel concentration of 3-5% at 
engine rooms #5 and #6 inlets, while this study indicates an average fuel concentration of 
19% for both engine rooms 5 and 6. This difference could be due to the lack of detailed 
data on the ventilation condition on the platform causing different turbulent conditions in 
the current study's simulation. As shown in Table 5.4, for durations of 200-300 and 400-
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600 seconds after the start of simulation, the fuel concentration for both the BP 
investigation report and the current study are in the flammable range. 
Table 5.4. Comparison of dispersion results 
Time Duration after the 100-200 200-300 300-400 400-500 500-600 
start of simulation ( s) 
BP Investigation Report FR* FR* Peak 21% FR* FR* 
Current Study Peak 19% FR* Peak 18.5% FR* FR* 
*FR: Flammable Range 
5.3.2 Explosion 
Figure 5.8 plots overpressure caused due to the explosion in engine room 6, where the 
ignition occurred. Monitor points 98 and 99 are in the middle of the confinement, monitor 
point 97 is located at the end of engine room and monitor point 100 is outside the engine 
room in front of the exhaust opening. The maximum overpressure of 1. 7 bar occurred 1.5 
seconds after the ignition happened in the middle of the engine room. According to Table 
5.1, this overpressure is in the range of probable total destruction of the engine room. 
Figure 5.9 illustrates the maximum overpressure from the beginning of the platform (the 
location of engine rooms) to the end of the platform (heliboard location). 
The release of flammable fuel on the platform caused the formation of the vapour fuel at 
the plant. The vapour hydrocarbon then dispersed on the main deck due to the wind effect 
and also the ventilation condition. A part of the fuel entered the engine rooms where the 
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most likely source of ignition was available. Due to high confinement of the engine room, 
the vapour fuel accumulated and ignited caused an intensive explosion with an 
overpressure of 1.7 (bar) (Figure 5.8). The explosion overpressure ranges between few 
mbar to several bar for deflagration and 15 to 20 bar for detonation [ Assael and 
Kakosimos, 201 0; Bjerketvedt, 1997]. The severity of the overpressure (at most 1. 7 bar in 
this study) demonstrates the occurrence of deflagration. Moreover, the current version of 
FLACS is not capable of simulating detonation. Then, the flame front reached the vapour 
hydrocarbon on the main deck of the platform causing another explosion. Starting from 
aft to forward of the platform, the trends of overpressure are shown in Figure 5.9. The 
overpressure is low on the aft side due to low congestion in this area. Then, it increased 
gradually to 0.1 (bar) around the drill floor. The increased overpressure at this location is 
due to the higher congested area because of buildings on the drill floor. Moreover, all 
sources of release were around the drill floor, making this the most vulnerable place for 
the higher concentration of fuel , which affected the overpressure. The explosion 
overpressure reached 0.3 (bar) when it passed drill floor in an area where the congestion 
was high due to the existence of some storage vessels and instruments. Then, the 
overpressure dropped to 0.1 (bar) at the forward side because of the lower congestion and 
lower concentration of flammable vapour. 
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Figure 5.8. Overpressure due to explosion in engine room 6 
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Figure 5.9. Overpressure vs. Distance from the Aft side to the Forward side of the platform 
According to Figures 5.8 and 5.9, there is a significant difference between the explosion 
overpressure monitored in the engine room (1.7 bar) and over the platform (0.3 bar). The 
higher overpressure in the engine room is due to high confinement where the 
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concentration of the trapped flammable vapour is high and the reflection from the 
sidewalls also affects the resulting overpressure. On the other hand, the low overpressure 
over the platform is because of the open area where the confinement/congestion is low 
and the vapour cloud that dispersed due to natural ventilation (Figure 5.1 0). Unlike the 
dispersion model discussion, there is no data or modelling to compare theses results to; 
however, the focus of this study was to demonstrate the utility of integrating the 
dispersion modelling with the explosion modelling. While the prediction of peak 
concentrations locations and times through dispersion modelling is important, the 
potential explosion and overpressure impacts are critical to the efficient and safe design 
of platforms. 
While the focus of this study was on consequence modeling of the explosion accident 
which occurred in BP Deepwater Horizon, the application of CFD codes to prevent such 
types of disasters or reducing the harmful effects is in progress. One important parameter 
affecting the explosion consequence is ventilation condition. Investigating different wind 
and ventilation conditions to reduce the accumulation of flammable vapour is suggested 
by Moros et al. [Moros et al., 1996]. The effectiveness of congestion/confinement on 
explosion overpressure and the use of blast walls or pressure relief panels to reduce the 
impacts of the accident were also investigated in some associated studies [Bakke and 
Wingerden, 1992; Middha and Wingerden, 2010]. CFD codes could be used to analyze 
the ventilation rate, configuration of congestion/confinement and the use of blast walls or 
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pressure relief panels. This study confirms that CFD codes are helpful tools to test and 
design safety measures for offshore petroleum facilities. 
Job=01(8)] VaFPMAX (ba•g) Tlf'rlF 325 184 (s) 
XY plaoe.Z: 12 m 
(m) 
Figure 5.10. Maximum overpressure contour plot at the surface of the platform 
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The BP Deepwater Horizon accident occurred in April 2010 through the release and 
ignition of flammable hydrocarbons, and resulted in the loss of 11 lives. Using the 
FLACS CFD code, a BP investigation team analyzed the dispersion of the flammable 
hydrocarbons released to the platform [BP, 201 OJ . However, the consequences of the 
explosion were not studied by BP and in this study the dispersion of the flammable gas 
was integrated with the explosion consequence. The results from the dispersion 
simulation showed the same trend as the analysis from the BP study [BP, 201 0]. The 
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explosion modelling, which is the contribution of the current study, predicted a high 
overpressure of 1. 7 (bar) in the engine room and around 0.8 bar on the platform. The 
effect of confinement/congestion on the explosion overpressure was also studied, where 
lower overpressure was observed in the low congested/confined area and higher 
overpressure in the highly congested/confined area. The overpressure on the platform was 
determined to be 0.07 bar, 0.21 bar, and 0.3 bar in low congestion areas, highly confined 
areas, and high congestion areas respectively. These overpressures are destructive as 
explained in Table 5.1. As the dispersion characteristics of the flammable vapour are 
important factors influencing the low and high limits of flammable concentration, 
considering this issue is a key point in the current study, while in other related studies 
with FLACS [Berg et al., 2000; Moros et al., 1996; Qiao and Zhang, 201 0; Wingerden 
and Salvesen, 1995], the explosion phenomena were simulated only with the uniform 
stoichiometric volume of the dispersed gas. By integrating these two phenomena (vapour 
cloud dispersion and explosion) in the current study, the model was able to track the gas 
concentration and also determine the resulting risk of different areas. The application of 
the CFD code in order to prevent such accidents in offshore operations is another 
important aspect of such studies. Thus, focusing on parameters such as the 
congestion/confinement configuration and also ventilation conditions are of interest in 
such studies. While the current study focused on modeling the consequence of the BP 
Deepwater Horizon explosion, it is recommended to use the CFD code to analyze the 
parameters such as ventilation rate, configuration of confinement/congestion and the use 
of blast walls or pressure relief panels. The effectiveness of such parameters to prevent 
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accidents or reduce the harmful effects caused after accidents has been reported by 
associated studies [Moros et al., 1996; Bakke and Wingerden, 1992; Middha and 
Wingerden, 201 0]. Smoke and heat radiation caused by the consequent fire also affect 
human health and offshore structures which are matter of concerns. This study confirms 
that the CFD code could be used as a tool to test and design safety measures. 
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Abstract 
Fire and explosion are accidents which potentially can occur in oil and gas processing 
facilities. While fire and explosion could occur as a consequence of each other, most 
published work has assessed fire and explosion separately, ignoring interactions between 
the two phenomena. 
The current study proposes a novel approach to model the entire sequences involved in a 
potential accident using liquid and gas release incidents as two test cases. The integrated 
scenario is modeled using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) codes FLACS and 
FDS. An integrated approach is adopted to analyze and represent the effects 
(injuries/death) of the accident. The proposed approach can be used in designing safety 
measures to minimize the adverse impacts of such accidents. It can also serve as an 
important tool to develop safety training to improve emergency preparedness plans. 
* Dadashzadeh, M., Khan, F., Hawboldt, K. , Amyotte, P. (20 13). An Integrated Approach for Fire and Explosion 
Consequence Modeling. Fire Safety Journal (under review). 
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Keywords: Liquid release, Gas release, Vapour cloud explosion, Pool fire, Accident 
modelling, CFD, Integrated scenario 
6.1 Introduction 
Several studies have modeled the consequences involved in the release of hydrocarbons. 
These studies range from advanced CFD modelling to comparison of different tools in 
accident modelling [Hansen et al. , 2009; Koo et al. , 2009; Gavelli et al. , 201 0; Kim and 
Salvesen, 2002; Skarsbo, 2011]. 
In a study conducted by Hansen et al. (2009), a FLACS CFD modelling was developed 
and compared with experimental data for liquefied natural gas (LNG) release and 
dispersion. As it is a cold dense cloud and is strongly affected by the field characteristics, 
simulating the dispersion of LNG vapour requires a complex model that considers the 
influencing factors. Using the FLACS CFD code and comparing the results with 
experimental data confirmed that FLACS is a suitable model to simulate the dispersion 
of LNG vapour 
Koo et al. (2009) conducted a study to model various accident scenarios at an LNG 
terminal using the PHAST software. Six different scenarios were constructed based on 
the LNG release hole sizes. Early and late pool fire effects were evaluated through this 
study. The study concluded that the accident would have an impact on areas outside the 
plant boundary, and that the late pool fire is a greater hazard than the early one. 
However, the focus of this study was only on pool fire modelling, ignoring the other 
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more credible scenanos, such as Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) and potential 
interactions. The use of CFD models to better simulate such accidents was recommended 
by Koo et al. (2009). 
In a study conducted by Gavelli et al. (201 0), the consequences resulting from the 
ignition of a flammable vapour cloud dispersed after the release of LNG during an 
offloading process were evaluated. FLACS CFD code was used to simulate the LNG 
spill, pool spreading and vapourization, vapour cloud dispersion and ignition leading to 
the vapour cloud explosion. The study demonstrated that the FLACS application was 
able to predict the consequences of accidents; the sequences of events led to a pool fire 
after the release of LNG and the possibilities of ignition and explosion. 
In a study by Kim and Salvesen (2002), the explosivity of LNG vapour after the release 
and formation of a liquid pool was modeled using FLACS. The LNG release occurred in 
a dike and dispersed to the process area where the source of ignition was located. The 
explosion overpressure was estimated and mitigation processes to decrease the explosion 
effects were presented. Reducing the thermal conductivity of the subsoil and increasing 
the height of the dike wall were the mitigation measures proposed to decrease the 
overpressure as a result of the explosion. While the vapour cloud explosion was 
addressed, no consideration was given to the pool fire which is a likely scenario 
occurring after the explosion. 
Skarsbo (2011) used CFD models FLACS and FDS to model the pool fire phenomenon. 
Simulation results were compared to experimental data from different sources. The study 
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demonstrated that both models over-estimate the flame temperature. This study focused 
only on the effects of fire, ignoring the entire sequences involved in such accidents and 
more importantly interactions of fire and explosion. 
LNG release consequences were extensively studied by Marry O'Connor Process Safety 
Center. The effects of parameters such as high expansion foam, dike wall height and 
floor conductivity on pool fire behaviour were investigated through these studies 
[Suardin et al. , 2009; Yun et al., 2011]. The modelling of LNG vapour dispersion and its 
validation against medium-scale LNG spill tests were also studied [Qi et al. , 201 0]. 
There are also comprehensive studies on the chain of accidents starting from one unit and 
spreading to different units such as reactors, pipelines, or storage vessels in chemical 
industries (domino effects) [HSE, 1981 ; Bagster and Pitblado, 1991; Khan and Abbasi, 
1998; Cozzani et al., 2006; Cozzani and Zanelli, 2001; Antonioni et al., 2009; Reniers et 
al., 2009]. One of the earliest attempts to study the domino effects was the Canvey 
report, prepared in a proposal of the construction of a new refinery on Canvey Island, 
UK. Through this study, all interactions between installations in the area were considered 
to determine risk associated with health and safety [HSE, 1981]. In 1991 , data from the 
Canvey report were used by Bagster and Pitblado to define a procedure of treatment of 
the domino effect. There was a gap of developing domino effect studies until 1998 when 
Khan and Abbasi (1998) developed a framework of the domino effect analysis (DEA). In 
this study, a "DEA" procedure was also coded and its application to several case studies 
was demonstrated. Subsequently, Cozzani and coworkers worked on domino effect 
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analysis using new data [Cozzani et al. , 2006; Cozzani and Zanelli, 2001; Antonioni et 
al., 2009]. In the recent study conducted by Reniers et al. [2009], a game-theory 
approach was developed to investigate the investments of different industries on domino 
effect prevention. 
The above studies consider only individual events such as fire or explosion [Gavelli et 
al., 2010; Kim and Salvesen, 2002; Skarsbo, 2011]. Combination of the events is more 
important as one event may lead to another, escalating the overall consequences. In the 
current study, the authors highlight the importance of integrated accident scenarios and 
their use in detailed consequence analysis using LNG and methane as hydrocarbons of 
interest in two test cases. The study is equally applicable to other similar compressed and 
refrigerated systems involving gases such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), natural gas 
liquids (NGLs) and propane. The major difference between the current study and the 
domino effect studies is that the current study is focusing on an evolving accident 
scenario which includes one unit and the occurrence of more than one event. The domino 
effect focuses on the escalation of events from one unit to other units and may include 
different hazardous chemicals. 
6.1.1 Hazards caused due to the release of hydrocarbons 
Release of flammable hydrocarbons to the surrounding environment could cause several 
types of hazards. If a flammable gas leak occurs, a quick ignition may lead to different 
types of fire such as a fire ball, jet fire or flash fire. The flammable gas could also be 
dispersed over the area and form a flammable vapour cloud. Then, a delayed ignition 
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could cause Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) depending on the level of 
congestion/confinement. On the other hand, a liquid leak of hydrocarbon could lead to a 
harmful accident. It may form a pool of liquid followed by vapourization due to the 
surrounding temperature. An immediate ignition may cause a pool fire. Another possible 
scenario is the dispersion of volatilized flammable vapour over the area causing the 
formation of a flammable vapour cloud at a distance from the pool leading to VCE due to 
a delayed ignition [Assael and Kakosimos, 2010]. 
In a usual accident occurrence, such events do not occur individually. There are 
interactions among different events causing evolving scenarios. For example, a vapour 
cloud explosion occurs at a distance from the source of release, the heat load caused by 
the explosion causes ignition at the release location and a jet fire occurs. Another good 
example of an evolving scenario is the interaction between the VCE and pool fire due to 
the release of a liquefied hydrocarbon such as LNG. The release of LNG to land or water 
could cause a rapidly evapourating pool and subsequent formation of a vapour cloud. An 
ignition source at any point in the vapour cloud could burn and cause a flash fire. The 
flash fire does not typically exceed a few tens of seconds; however, if the flash fire bums 
back to the pool or the ignition starts at the pool, a pool fire occurs. Further, a delayed 
ignition would provide enough time for the fuel vapour to disperse and form a vapour 
cloud which if ignited would cause a VCE and resulting overpressure. The heat load after 
the explosion enhances the vapourization over the liquid pool causing a pool fire [Ramos 
et al. , 2011 ; Woodward and Pitblado, 2010]. 
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In this study, the interaction between the fire and explosion and the resulting 
consequences are modeled. This type of model can be used to design effective safety 
measures to prevent and mitigate consequences and to develop efficient safety training 
and emergency preparedness. 
6.1.2 Past major accidents and their analysis 
On October 1944, an LNG tank in Cleveland, Ohio failed and released all its contents to 
the surrounding area including streets and sewers. The LNG then vapourized and formed 
a vapour cloud. An unknown source of ignition contacted the vapour cloud and a massive 
fire and consequent explosion in the residential area followed. The explosion led to the 
deaths of 131 people [Yang et al., 2011]. 
Another LNG accident occurred in the Skikda LNG plant, Algeria in 2004. After a 
release of LNG, the fuel vapour entered an adjacent boiler through an inlet fan. The fuel 
mixed with air and the resulting increase in the pressure led to an explosion. The heat 
load from the explosion reached the fuel vapour near the leak area and caused the second 
explosion [Achour and Hached, 2004]. 
Other LNG accidents have also been reported by The California Energy Commission 
[The California Energy Commission, 2012]. In August 1987, at U.S. Department of 
Energy Test Site, Nevada, an LNG vapour release occurred and the vapour was ignited 
by an unknown source. In another LNG accident in Indonesia in 1983, the failure of a 
heat exchanger due to overpressurization in an LNG plant led to an explosion. In New 
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York in 1973, during the repair of an empty LNG storage tank, a fire accidentally started. 
The fast pressure increase inside the tank then led to the falling of the concrete dome on 
the tank and caused the death of37 people. 
In March 2005 at BP's Texas City refinery an explosion resulted in the loss of 15 lives 
and 180 injuries [CSB, 2007]. In this accident, a flammable liquid hydrocarbon was 
released to the ground around a knockout drum stack. The flammable liquid was 
vapourized, forming a vapour cloud at the top of the liquid pool. Atmospheric wind 
pushed the vapours and droplets downwind, causing them to mix with air. The vapour 
cloud then reached an ignition source which was most likely an idling pickup truck near 
the area, causing VCE. The heat load through the VCE reached the accumulated vapour 
above the liquid pool and caused a pool fire and subsequent explosions [Kalantamia, 
2010; Khan and Amyotte, 2007]. According to Broadribb (2006), the failure to control 
the release and the failure to respond appropriately resulted in the explosion. 
In an accident at the McKee refinery, Texas (2007), the escaped propane from a high-
pressure system formed a vapour cloud which caught fire when exposed to an ignition 
source. The released liquid from a cracked elbow rapidly formed a flammable vapour 
cloud due to the weather conditions. The flammable vapour spread to a boiler house due 
to the wind direction and an explosion occurred. Consequently, the resulting flames 
reached the leak source and intensified the fuel vapourization and the flame propagation 
in the area. Due to the size and the intensity of the fire, the access to the manual shut-off 
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valves and pump on-off switches were blocked, and this led to a continuous discharge of 
propane and a jet fire [CSB, 2008]. 
A review of past accidents and models [Yang et al., 2011; Achour and Hached, 2004; 
The California Energy Comission, 2012; CSB, 2007; CSB, 2008] demonstrates the need 
to evaluate the entire accident sequence to mitigate the impact, develop appropriate 
response methods, and prevent accidents by designing safety into the system. 
6.2 Proposed methodology 
The methodology is outlined in Figure 6.1 . The first step in the model is the release of 
hydrocarbon and subsequent pool formation (of liquid fuel). Then, the evapouration (of 
liquid fuel) and dispersion of hydrocarbon as per the ambient conditions are simulated, 
followed by the delayed ignition and explosion of the dispersed vapour. FLACS is used to 
model these steps. FLACS is a 3-dimensional CFD simulation tool. On a structured, 
fixed, rectangular grid, FLACS uses a backward Euler time integration scheme. The 
pressure-velocity coupling is solved by the SIMPLE algorithm of Patankar while the 
linear equations are solved by efficient solvers. The evapouration is modeled using the 
heat transfer from the substrate, wind speed, turbulence and vapour pressure above the 
pool. For the LNG source model, the 2D shallow water equations are used [Hansen et al., 
2009]. 
In the second step, the energy released from the explosion is used as a source to 
evapourate and ignite the rest of fuel. Temperatures and other useful parameters are 
extracted from the first step in fire simulation which is modeled with Fire Dynamic 
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Simulator (FDS). Developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) of the United States Department of Commerce, FDS uses partial differential 
equations to describe the transportation of mass, momentum and energy for the fire and 
its impact in the surrounding area [NIST, 2010]. Using the Large-Eddy Simulation (LES) 
method, FDS solves the conservation equations and updates the solutions based on time 
on a three-dimensional grid. The finite volume technique is used to estimate the thermal 
radiation [Gavelli et al. , 2010). 
In the third step, the probit model (Pr = c1 + c2lnD) is used to calculate probabilities of 
effects for the heat and overpressure load [ 16]. 
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The fourth step integrates the effects through a grid-based approach. To simplify the 
consequence assessment process, consequence severity is mapped as an index. This index 
illustrates the severity of consequences at any location in the accident area. 
Table 6.1. Major human effects caused by fire and explosion [assail and Kakosimos, 2010] 
Accident Effect type Damage 
type 
Fire Probability of • 1st degree bums affect only the epidermis or outer 
InJUry from 1st layer of skin. The bum site is red, painful, dry, and 
degree bum with no blisters. Mild sunburn is an example. Long-
term tissue damage is rare and usually consists of 
an alteration of the skin colour. 
Probability of • 2nd degree bums involve the epidermis and part of 
injury from 2nd the dermis layer of skin (0. 7 - 0.12 mm depth). The 
degree bum bum site appears red, blistered, and may be swollen 
and painful. 
Probability of 
death 
Explosion Probability of • Eardrum rupture is a direct effect of overpressure 
0 0 from difference during an explosion. InJUry 
eardrum rupture 
Probability of • The explosion can cause a sudden pressure 
death from lung difference between the inside and outside of the 
damage lungs, as the pressure to which the human body is 
subjected suddenly increases. As a consequence, the 
thorax is pressed inwards, causing lung damage and 
possible death. Since the inward pressure process is 
associated with a finite time, in addition to the value 
of the overpressure, its duration is also important. 
Probability of • The shock wave can push the head of a person 
death from head backwards, resulting in skull rupture or fracture, or 
impact even the collision of the head with another 
stationary or non-station'!!}'_ obiect. 
Probability of • The shock wave can throw the whole body 
death from whole backwards, causing death because of its impact with 
body other objects. 
displacement 
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Based on damages caused by different effects (Table 6.1) and experts' judgment, they are 
ranked on a scale of 1 to 10 as given in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. Scores (S) for seven major human effects caused by fire and explosion 
Hazard Fire Explosion 
Effects I st 2nd deat lung damage eardrum rupture head impact whole body displacement degree degree h (death) (injury) (death) (death) 
Score 2 5 10 8 5 10 10 (S) 
The severity index for each type of effects at any location at the plant is calculated as 
follows: 
6.1 
where, Riski denotes the risk index for each type of effect. In the next stage, the 
maximum Riski for the fire and explosion are estimated (Riskr and Riske). 
Riskt = L Risk1 +Riske 6.2 
Therefore, any location at the plant has a Risk1 enabling the creation of contour-based risk 
considering cumulative effects. 
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6.3 Case studies 
6.3.1 Case study 1: LNG vapour cloud explosion and the consequent pool fire 
6.3.1.1 Scenario definition 
In this scenario 200 kg/s of natural gas is released at a LNG processing plant. The release 
duration is 100 s and the wind speed was 3 m/s with an ambient temperature of 25 °C. A 
pool of LNG is formed at the release location and vapourization occurred due to ambient 
conditions. The vapourized LNG is then dispersed by the wind and fuel vapour cloud 
formed at the process area. At 60 s, a delayed ignition occurs in the process area which 
leads to a destructive VCE in the process. The energy released due to the explosion 
enhances the LNG vapourization over the LNG pool and causes a pool fire at the release 
location. The required parameters are defined according to Middha and Melheim 
[Middha and Melheim, 201 0]. 
6.3.1.2 Application of the methodology 
6.3.1.2.1 Step 1: Release, pool formation and spreading, vapourization and 
dispersion of LNG vapour 
The geometry considered in this study is shown in Figure 6.2. The simulation volume is 
considered as 80 m x 40 m x 20 m with the grid resolution of 2 m for x and y directions 
and 1 m for z direction. Sensitivity analysis was used to select the grid resolution to make 
the solutions independent of the mesh sizes [I chard et al., 201 0]. Around the leak 
location, the grid resolution was adjusted to 0.5 m while at the locations far from the pool 
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area, grids were stretched. The finer grid around the leak takes into account the need for 
more information in the areas of the greatest impact, while the coarser grid is used in 
areas where the impact is much less in severity. Having denser meshes around the leak 
area was also previously advised by Gjesdal (2000) and Hanna et al. (2004). The total 
number of grids during the dispersion simulation was 31000 control volumes. 
•:· 
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Figure 6.2. The considered geometry 
Following the release, it required 100 s for enough vapour to be formed (ambient 
temperature = 25 °C; ground roughness = 0.01; Pasquill class = D; gas composition = 
95% methane, 3% ethane and 2% propane). Pool characteristics and the fuel 
concentration were monitored during the dispersion simulation and are plotted in Figure 
6.3. 
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Figure 6.3. Dispersion of vapourized fuel over the plant(-) 
6.3.1.2.2 Stepl-continued: Modeling the explosion of LNG vapour 
Figure 6.3 demonstrates the mass fraction of fuel in the mixture of fuel, atr, and 
combustion products over the plant. The engine room under the shelter is a potential 
ignition source. Thus, the ignition location is defined under the shelter. Based on the 
dispersion results (Figure 6.3), the time of ignition is selected at 50 s when the maximum 
amount of fuel vapour is monitored. The geometry is adjusted to simulate the explosion. 
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The simulation volume is 70 m x 40 m x 20 m with the grid dimension of 1 m in all 
directions. 
6.3.1.2.3 Step 2: Modeling the pool fire 
The output data including the temperature change due to the explosion and the pool 
diameter and depth (Figure 6.4) were extracted from FLACS and used as input 
parameters for pool fire modelling in FDS. The LNG pool depth ranges from 2 mm on 
the outer boundary of the liquid pool to 6 mm at the release location. The same geometry 
in Figure 6.2 was also created in FDS with grid dimension of 1 m in all directions. A hot 
surface was defined over the pool to model the enhanced vapourization due to the heat 
load after the explosion. The average temperature of the hot surface is extracted from 
FLACS explosion output. 
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Figure 6.4. LNG pool diameter and depth after the explosion (m) 
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6.3.2 Case study 2: BP Deepwater Horizon vapour cloud explosion and the 
consequent fire 
6.3.2.1 Scenario definition 
In 2010, the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout resulted in the release of flammable vapour 
over the platform causing the explosion and fire which led to 11 lost lives. According to 
the BP investigation report, the most important release locations were defined as the riser 
bore at the drill floor, the mud gas separator vent at the top of the rig, the mud gas 
separator (MGS) rupture disk!diverter outlet, the slip joint below the moon pool and the 
mud processing system (tanks and mud pit room exhaust vent) [BP, 2010]. The 
flammable vapour dispersed over the plant due to the wind. Through ventilation inlets, 
the flammable gas found its way to engine rooms where the most likely sources of 
ignition are located. The flame propagation resulting from the consequent explosion 
reached the flammable vapour dispersed over the platform and led to the fire at the 
source of release around the drilling floor. 
6.3.2.2 Application of the methodology 
6.3.2.2.1 Step 1: Release, dispersion and explosion of flammable vapour 
The geometry considered in this study is shown in Figure 6.5. The simulation volume 
was assumed to be 116 mx71 mx104 m and the grid size was set as 1 (m). Sensitivity 
analysis was used to eliminate the dependency of the results on the mesh size. Grids were 
refined around the leak areas and some ventilation points. The time of simulation was 
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assumed to be 570 s, while the first 60 s were the start up period where only the 
ventilation points were in operation. The release of flammable gas started after 60 s. The 
total number of grids during the dispersion simulation was 31000 control volumes. 
In order to control the time steps, Courant-Friedrich-Levy (CFLC and CFLV) numbers of 
5 and 0.5 were selected, respectively. CFLC and CFLV are based on the sound velocity 
and the fluid flow velocity, respectively. The CFLC and CFL V control the sound waves 
and the fluid flow propagation distance in each time step, which is the average control 
volume length multiplied by the value of CFLC and CFLV. As an example, by defining a 
CFLC value of 5 and a CFL V value of 0.5, the pressure will propagate 5 cells while the 
fluid flow propagates 0.5 cells in each time step [GEXCON, 2010]. The CFLC and 
CFL V numbers determined were optimized to guarantee convergence. Figure 6.5 
outlines the geometry based on the data available in BP's investigation report for this 
modelling scenario. 
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Figure 6.5. BP Deepwater Horizon geometry used for dispersion/explosion simulation 
After the dispersion simulation, geometry details were changed in order to initiate the 
explosion simulation of the flammable vapour cloud which was the focus of this study. 
The fuel cloud formed through the dispersion simulation should be in the flammable 
limit. The gas composition [BP, 2010] had a Lower Flammable Limit (LFL) of0.02 and 
an Upper Flammable Limit of 0.12. The flammable cloud within this limit was used in 
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explosion simulation. The maximum gas concentration was observed after 320 s and this 
was set as the time of ignition. The ignition location was set in engine room 6 where the 
highest concentration of flammable gas was observed. After 320 s, the simulation was re-
started to observe the overpressure caused by the ignition. Figure 6.6 illustrates the 
location of engine rooms. 
Figure 6.6. Second deck, configuration of engine rooms #1 to #6 
Highly congested areas result in turbulence generation. Consequently, the combustion 
rate is enhanced leading to higher overpressure. The congestion parameter is an 
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important factor in complex geometries and is calculated by dividing the total length (m) 
of all items on the main deck (cylinders and boxes) by the total volume (m3) of the area 
of interest. Extracting the total length of cylinders and boxes on the main deck, the 
congestion parameter of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig was estimated to be 0.48 
(m/m3) which is categorized as a low congested level [Huser et al. , 2009]. 
6.3.2.2.2 Step 2: Modelling the jet fire 
For the jet fire modelling, the release rate of flammable vapour on the drilling floor was 
selected as the jet release rate. Extracting the geometry data from FLACS, FDS code was 
used to model the consequent jet fire. The time of simulation was selected as 5 s with a 
mesh size of 0.5 m in all directions. 
6.4 Results and discussions 
6.4.1 Case study 1: Explosion 
The overpressure that resulted from the explosion was not significant over the plant; 0 
bar at open areas and 0.5 bar at the edges of the shelter in an enclosed area (Figure 6. 7). 
The existence of the complex confined geometry leads to high explosion overpressure. 
Thus, the low overpressure due to the low level of confinement/congestion in the current 
study is consistent with past studies and experimental observations [Huser et al., 2009]. 
However, low values of explosion overpressure do not have an impact on this study as 
the integration of consequences is of concern and not only the individual event. 
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Figure 6.7. Explosion overpressure over the plant (bar) 
Using the probit model (Step 3), the probabilities of injuries/death caused by the 
explosion overpressure were calculated. Then, as step 4 of the approach, the explosion 
risk index (Riske) was estimated and plotted for the plant (Figure 6.8). While higher 
values of Riske (0.5) are located under the shelter, lower values are seen in open areas 
(0.1 ). The low values of Riske over the plant are in accordance with low overpressure 
over the plant due to the low level of congestion/confinement in the current study [Huser 
et al., 2009; Hansen et al., 201 0]. 
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Figure 6.9. Temperature after the explosion over the pool of LNG (K) 
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The other output monitored during the explosion was the temperature over the LNG 
pool. The temperature of 300 K is observed far from the explosion point, whereas 1600 
K is observed at the areas close to the explosion location (Figure 6.9). The flame 
temperature of 1500 K is reported for LNG burning by Assael and Kakosimos (2010). 
The extracted temperature shown in Figure 6.9 is used as input data in pool fire 
modelling. 
6.4.2 Case study 1: Pool fire 
The heat radiation vs. distance profile was developed as shown in Figure 10. The 
radiation values were in a range between 0 and 70 kW/m2. According to Asseal and 
Kakosimos (2010), the low thermal radiation intensity limit is 1 kW/m2 . Thus, heat 
radiation values less than this limit are neglected in Figure 6.1 0. 
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Figure 6.10. Heat radiation caused by the pool fire over the plant (kW/m2) 
The probability of first and second degree injury and the probability of death at different 
locations of the plant were calculated (Step 3). Subsequently, the fire risk index (Riskr) 
of all grid points was estimated and plotted over the plant. The range of these values 
varies from 1 at the furthest distance from the fire location to the maximum value of 10 
at the flame surface (Figure 6.11 ). This illustrates the higher risk closer to the release 
location. 
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Figure 6.11. Pool fire risk profile(-) 
6.4.3 Case study 1: Integration of effects 
Finally, the estimated effects for both fire and explosion were integrated as per step 4 of 
the proposed methodology (Figure 6.12). As there is a certain distance between the 
location of the pool (where the fire occurs) and the ignition source (where the explosion 
happens), Figure 12 shows the integrated contours in two different places of the plant. 
The range of contour values is between 0 and 20. While there are negligible values 
around the explosion area, the values over the LNG pool are high showing more effects 
for fire than explosion over the plant. As one moves further from the LNG pool, the 
values are lower, due to lower confinement/congestion. The amount of released fuel also 
affects the risk values due to enhancement of the explosion overpressure and heat load. 
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Assael and Kakosimos (201 0) studied the effects of fuel mass increase on increasing 
overpressure. The results of the new methodology confirm the effectiveness of an 
integrated approach to consider the hazardous area over the plant. It is noteworthy that 
while an individual phenomenon (explosion) does not have high risk index values, 
considering both the explosion and the consequent pool fire shows a higher risk index 
over the plant, which is useful for safety design and emergency preparedness. 
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Figure 6.12. Integrated risk profile(-) 
6.4.4 Case study 2: Explosion 
The explosion overpressure ranges between 0 to 3 bar over the platform. It is evident 
from Figure 6.13 that there is high overpressure around the pipe racks where the level of 
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congestion is high due to the storage of pipes. The effect of high congestion/confinement 
on explosion overpressure was discussed by Husser et al. (2009). Further from the pipe 
racks, the explosion overpressure decreases gradually, reaching its lowest value over the 
platform (0.1 bar). This is due to less congestion/confinement causing less turbulence, 
and the flammable vapour is also dispersed over the open area. 
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Figure 6.13. Explosion overpressure over the plant (bar) 
Using the probit model (Step 3), the probabilities of injuries/death caused by the 
explosion overpressure were calculated. Then, as step 4, the explosion risk index (Riske) 
was estimated and plotted over the facility (Figure 6.14). While high values of Riske (1 0) 
are located in pipe rack areas, further from the highly congested area, the Riske 
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approaches a value of around 2. The ranges of Riske were set from 2 to l 0, thus, a lower 
value of explosion risk is not demonstrated in Figure 6.14. 
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Figure 6.14. Explosion risk profile(-) 
6.4.5 Case study 2: Jet fire 
Modelling the consequent jet fire after the explosion (Step 2), the heat radiation profile 
versus distance was developed (Figure 6.15). The radiation values are in a range between 
0 and 80 kW/m2• The jet fire occurs at the release location on the drilling floor, thus the 
highest heat radiation value (80 kW/m2) was observed on the flame surface. 
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Figure 6.15. Heat radiation caused by the jet fire over the plant (kW/m2) 
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Figure 6.16. Jet fire risk profile(-) 
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Applying step 3, the probability of injury and death at different locations in the plant were 
calculated and the fire risk index (Riskf) on all grid points was plotted for the plant. The 
range of these values varies from 2 at the furthest distance from the fire location to the 
maximum value of 10 at the flame surface (Figure 6.16). This illustrates the higher risk 
closer to the release location. 
6.4.6 Case study 2: Integration of effects 
The effects of both fire and explosion were integrated as per step 4 of the methodology 
(Figure 6.17). As there is a significant distance between the release location (where the 
fire occurs) and the main explosion area (where the existence of pipe racks leads to 
significant overpressure), Figure 6.17 demonstrates the integrated contours in two 
different places in the plant. The range of contour values is between 0 and 20. It is clear 
from Figure 6.17 that there is a high risk value for both fire and explosion phenomena at 
different locations of the plant. The results of the applied methodology confirm the 
effectiveness of an integrated approach. It is worth reemphasizing that while individual 
phenomena (explosion and fire) have high risks, considering both the explosion and the 
consequent jet fire shows more portions of the facility with high values of risk. This 
information is useful for safety design and emergency preparedness. 
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Figure 6.17. Integrated risk profile(-) 
A new methodology using CFD codes was proposed to model the consequences due to 
hydrocarbon release. Using CFD codes FLACS and FDS, the vapour cloud explosion 
and the consequent fire were modeled. To evaluate the cumulative impact of explosion 
overpressure and the fire heat load, an integrated approach was adopted to predict the 
level of risk over the entire sequence; the level of risk over the plant was presented by a 
total risk index (Riskt). Applying the developed methodology to two case studies, the 
integrated level of risk was estimated; VCE and pool fire for LNG release and VCE and 
jet fire for methane gas release. In the LNG case, the explosion risk was insignificant, but 
the integrated risk was high due to pool fire effects. In the methane gas case, both the 
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explosion and jet fire have significant level of risk (1 0) and the integrated risk was 
observed to be high at two different locations due to the explosion and jet fire. Due to 
considering the interaction between events, the integrated methodology is more 
conservative when compared with existing methods. The results demonstrate the 
advantage of using the integrated approach over the modelling of a single phenomenon. 
While other related studies [Gevelli et al., 2010; Kim and Salvesen, 2002; Skarsbo, 2011] 
focused only on modelling the effects of fire or explosion individually, the integrated 
scenario and assessed cumulative risk make the current study unique. Considering 
interactions in an evolving accident scenario and taking into account the integration of 
consequences is useful for safety measure design of process facilities and it is essential to 
design effective emergency preparedness plans. 
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Abstract 
Products of a hydrocarbon fire accident have both chronic and acute health effects. They 
cause respiratory issues to lung cancer. While fire is the most frequent phenomenon 
among the offshore accidents, predicting the contaminants' concentration and their 
behaviour are key issues. Safety measures design, such as ventilation and emergency 
routes based only on predicted contaminants' concentration seems not to be the best 
approach. In a combustion process, various harmful substances are produced and their 
concentration cannot be added. The time duration that any individual spends in different 
locations of an offshore installation also varies significantly. A risk-based approach 
considers the duration a person is exposed to contaminants at various locations and also 
evaluates the hazardous impacts. A risk-based approach has also an additivity 
characteristic which helps to assess overall risk. 
* Dadashzadeh, M., Khan, F., Abbassi, R., Hawboldt, K. (20 13). Combustion Products Toxicity Risk 
Assessment in an Offshore Installation. Journal of Process Safety and Environmental Protection (under 
review). 
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Through the current study, an approach is proposed to be used for risk assessment of 
combustion products dispersion phenomenon in a confined or semi-confined facility. 
Considering CO, N02 and CH4 as the contaminants of concern, the dispersion of the 
substances over the layout of the facility after a LNG fire is modeled. Considering 
different exposure times for three major parts of the facility including the processing 
area, office area and the accommodation module, the risk contours of CO, N02 and CH4 
over the entire facility are developed. The additivity characteristic of the risk-based 
approach was used to calculate the overall risk. The proposed approach helps to better 
design safety measures to minimize the impacts and effective emergency evacuation 
planning. 
Key Words: CFD, Combustion products, Toxic dispersion, Risk-based approach 
7.1 Introduction 
Harmful airborne contaminants m a process facility are a matter of concern. It is 
important to provide a safe environment for personnel working in a processing area. 
Predicting the risks caused from airborne toxicants is a useful approach to emergency 
preparedness. 
Offshore personnel spend most of their time in a semi enclosed processing area or an 
enclosed office/residential area. Thus, it is important to minimize harmful effects during 
an accidental event. According to Pula et al. (2005), fire is the most frequent accident 
occurring on offshore installations. One of the main sources of concern is the combustion 
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of hydrocarbons due to fire accidents [Hartzell, 2001]. Thus, there is a need to carefully 
assess the hazards caused by a fire accident such as heat radiation and airborne toxic 
contaminants (combustion products). 
An example of toxic dispersing in an industrial accident is the massive fire which 
occurred at oil storage in 2005 at Oil Storage Depots (Buncefield, Hertfordshire, 
England). The production of smoke and combustion products caused environmental 
problems and health issues over the plant and near-by areas showing the need to estimate 
the toxic substance concentration at and around the plant [Markatos et al., 2009]. The 
Piper Alpha explosion in the North Sea is another example of the hazards caused by 
combustion products. In 1988, the failure of a condensate injection pump caused a leak 
and was followed by a small explosion. Due to the failure of safety equipment, a series of 
major blasts occurred followed by a fireball. Then, the failure of the gas pipeline riser led 
to a massive explosion which was the reason for the collapse of the drilling derrick. The 
loss of 167 lives in the Piper Alpha disaster was demonstrated to be mainly from the 
smoke inhalation due to the massive fire [Knight and Pretty, 1997]. 
Safety measure design and emergency preparedness are not very effective when they are 
only based on contaminants' concentration. Personnel spend different time durations in 
various locations of an offshore facility (different exposure time) and the concentration 
of various toxic substances cannot be added. As a solution, a risk-based approach helps 
to consider the time duration when personnel are exposed to air pollutants at different 
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sections of a plant. Additionally, it helps to combine the harmful effects caused by 
various toxic substances [Markatos, 2012]. 
According to Srehic and Chen (2002), the application of Computational Fluid Dynamics 
(CFDs) is a common method of assessing air quality characteristics such as pollution 
concentration and air flow patterns. CFDs codes were extensively used in dispersion 
studies such as a liquefied natural gas (LNG) spill [Gavelli et al., 2008], heavy gas 
dispersion over large topographically complex areas [Scargiali et al., 2005] and indoor 
dispersion of toxic chemical substances [Kassomenos et al., 2008; Mcbride et al., 2001]. 
CFD codes have the advantages of low cost, high speed, capability to provide complete 
information and the ability to model ideal and realistic conditions [Bo and Guo-ming, 
2010]. 
The focus of this study is to develop a methodology to apply a CFDs code to assess the 
dispersion of combustion products from a fire incident over a platform in combination 
with a risk-based approach to develop the risk profile. This is helpful for the safety 
measures design on offshore facilities. It is also useful to plan any emergency actions 
required on an installation during an accident. 
7.2 Toxicity risk assessment approach 
Air borne combustion products cause adverse effects on both human health and the 
environment. These effects vary from primary ones (coughing and respiratory) to 
secondary long term effects (lung cancer and cardiovascular diseases). 
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Figure 7.1. A methodology of toxic risk assessment 
Toxicity risk assessment helps to develop a risk profile for the area of concern and also 
helps to plan risk minimization strategies. Figure 7.1 illustrates the risk assessment 
approach proposed by the current study. Hazard identification, dispersion modeling, 
exposure assessment, dose-response assessment and risk estimation are the main steps of 
the proposed risk assessment approach. Details of each step are given below. 
7.2.1 Risk assessment 
7.2.1.1 Hazard identification 
Three major harmful combustion products produced due to an LNG fire are carbon 
monoxide (CO), nitrogen dioxide (N02) and unburned methane (CH4) [Kajtar and 
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Leitner, 2007]. Table 7.1 shows the emission factors, fuel consumption and flow rates for 
natural gas combustion [USEPA, 1995; Assael and Kakosimos, 2010]. 
Table 7.1. Emission factors, fuel consumption and the flow rate of CO and N02 
Emission Emission factor Fuel consumption Flow rate (gs-1) 
(gm-3) (m3s-t) 
co 4.48 0.5653 2.53 
N02 1.344 0.5653 0.76 
CH4 0.0368 0.5653 0.021 
Table 7.2 [Abbassi et al., 2012] shows the harmful effects associated with these three 
contaminants. 
Table 7.2. Adverse health effects lAbbassi et al., 2012; OSHA, 2003) 
Health hazard 
air pollution 
parameters 
co 
Adverse health effects 
Cardiovascular effects: Low level CO is the most serious for 
those who suffer from heart disease such as angina, clogged 
arteries or congestive heart failure. 
Central nervous system effects: High levels of CO can result in 
vision problems, reduced ability to work or learn, reduced 
manual dexterity and difficulty performing complex tasks. 
Poisonous: At extremely high levels, CO is poisonous and can 
cause death. 
Respiratory effects: Chronic respiratory symptoms (cough and 
phlegm), more frequent in children. 
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Poisonous: At extremely high levels, N02 is poisonous and can 
cause death. 
Methane is an asphyxiant gas which displaces oxygen and 
causes hypoxia. 
7.2.1.2 Dispersion modeling using FLACS CFD code 
Using FLACS CFDs code [GEXCON, 2010], the dispersion of the contaminants of 
concern on an offshore installation is modeled. Using a finite volume method in a 
Cartesian grid, the concentration equations of mass, momentum and enthalpy are solved 
using FLACS. For turbulence modelling, FLACS uses a Reynold-Averaged Navier-
Stoke (RANS) approach based on the standard k-e model [Mouilleau and Charnpassith, 
2009]. Obstacles with small details play a significant role during confined dispersion of 
pollutants and as such the representation of these details is a key aspect of dispersion 
modelling. A distributed porosity concept is used in FLACS dispersion simulation as 
obstacles are represented by area and volume porosity [Hanna et al. , 2004]. 
Compared to other dispersion models, FLACS has advantages such as better predictions 
that have been validated for different dispersion scenarios. The distributed porosity 
concept to create complex geometries and the Cartesian grid result in more rapid 
solutions in large and complex facilities when compared to conventional models. 
Additionally, the well-established turbulence model (k-£) compared to other alternative 
models makes FLACS more appropriate to simulate dispersion phenomena [HSE, 2010]. 
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7.2.1.2.1 Geometry definition 
A typical offshore installation is selected as the geometry for the study (Figure 7.2). The 
considered offshore installation consists of three major parts including the process area, 
the office area and the residential area. An LNG pool fire was assumed to have occurred 
at the process area. The emission of combustion due to the LNG pool fire was modeled 
with the addition of 16 leak points over the pool area. 
CFLC and CFL V are Courant-Friedrich-Levy numbers based on the sound velocity and 
the fluid flow velocity, respectively. By choosing the appropriate values of CFLC and 
CFLV, the sound waves and the fluid flow propagate a limited distance in each time step; 
the average control volume length multiplied by the value of CFLC and CFLV. In the 
current study, to control time steps, the CFLC and CFLV numbers were assumed to be 
20 and 2, which is suggested by FLACS user's manual [GEXCON, 2010]. The 
simulation volume of 57 m x 40 m x 6 m was selected with a grid size of 1 m, obtained 
as an optimum value through a sensitivity analysis. The time of simulation was chosen as 
3,600 s for leak points during the entire simulation. There was no absorption of 
emissions by obstacles as the porosity of all objects was considered to be 1. 
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Figure 7.2. Schematic of offshore instaUation considered in modeling scenario 
7.2.1.3 Exposure assessment 
(m) 
Time spent by the personnel at different locations of the offshore installation is the 
exposure time. Time spent by offshore personnel at different locations of the platform is 
demonstrated in Figure 7.3 . According to HSE (2008), it was assumed that an individual 
spent 12 hours outside the residential area; 8 hours in the process area and 4 hours in the 
office area. The rest of the day is assumed to be spent in the residential area (1 2 hours). 
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Figure 7.3. Time spent by a person during a day 
7.2.1.4 Dose-response assessment 
111 • ..-I,.-
J Iu s tlav 
8 ltu :da:--· 
The probability and severity of the damage to a person's health is related to the risk agent 
through the dose-response assessment. The threshold dose on the dose-response curve 
shows the highest concentration at which there is no adverse effect of inhaling the 
contaminant over a period of time. The American Conference of Governmental Industrial 
Hygienists (ACGIH) determines the threshold limit values (TLVs). TLV-STEL presents 
the short-term exposure limit for which an employee is exposed with no adverse effect. 
In the current study, the values ofTLV-STEL for CO, N02 and CH4 are 440, 45 and 705 
mg.m-3, respectively [ACGIH, 1991). 
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7.2.1.5 Risk estimation 
For an individual contaminant, risk is calculated through the integration of the exposure 
and toxicity assessment (Equation l ). Then, the additive property of risk is estimated by 
summing the individual risk values for the mixture of contaminants (Equation 2. 
Exposure concentration 
RISK= TLV- STEL 
i 
RISK1 = L RISKi 
0 
where BW is the body weight. 
7.3 Results 
Concentration x Time spent/BW 
TLV- STEL/BW 7.1 
7.2 
The natural ventilation caused by wind is the main reason for the dispersing of the 
contaminants of concern over the semi-confined area. The low vector velocities are seen 
in the engine rooms at the left end of the process area which is reasonable due to their 
being sheltered (Figure 7.4). Recirculation of air is seen around the vessels because of 
high congestion/confinement around this area. The same situation happens inside the 
office and the residential buildings. While the air enters the buildings through the 
openings, it hits the inside walls and trapped inside causing the recirculation. At the 
residential area, air is getting out through the entrance which is due to the negative 
pressure caused by the high velocity of wind outside the building. 
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Figure 7.4. Air flow over the plant due to wind effect 
According to Zhang and Zhao (2007), the average height for an individual inhaling air 
contaminants is 1.5 m. Thus, the CO, N02 and CH4 concentration at 1.5 m from the 
ground was monitored (Figures 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7). The concentrations of contaminants are 
very high near the source of release. There are also high concentrations monitored at 
engine rooms where emissions trapped under the shelter. Wind velocity is the main 
reason for dispersing the contaminants of concern from the fire area to the office and 
residential area. The further distances of the office area and residential area from the 
source is the reason for their lower concentrations compared to other areas. 
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Figure 7.6. N02 concentration (mgm-3) 
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Figure 7.7. CH4 concentration (mgm-3) 
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Figure 7.8. Hazard quotients (Riskc0 ) for CO inhalation over the plant 
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Figure 7.9. Hazard quotients (Risk Noz) for N02 inhalation over the plant 
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Figure 7.10. Hazard quotients (Riskcu4) for CH4 inhalation over the plant 
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Risk values for the contaminants of concern were calculated based on the explained 
methodology. As shown in Figures 7.8-7.10, risk values are high around the release 
source which is due to the high concentration of contaminants in this area. However, it is 
observed that in the process area there are high values of risk for all contaminants, while 
lower ones are seen at office and residential areas. The longer exposure duration (12 
hr.day-1) and the high concentration of the contaminants due to congestion/confinement 
are the reasons for these high risk values. It can be seen that the exposure duration plays 
a significant role in risk estimation as the concentrations of contaminants are to some 
extent high in the office area while the risk is negligible. On the other hand, from the 
individual risks shown in Figures 7.8-7.1 0, it is observed that the majority of the office 
area and the entire residential area are in a safe level of contaminants. 
50 
" 
Figure 7.11. Final risk (Riske) for N02, CO and CH4 inhalation over the plant 
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As explained by the methodology, one of the significant features of the risk assessment is 
its additivity characteristic for a mixture of contaminants. Figure 7.11 demonstrates the 
Riskr considered for the combined effects of CO, N02 and CH4 hazard quotients. While 
Figures 7.8-7.10 show a safe level for the majority of office and residential areas, Riskr 
shows significant portions of the office area exceeding the acceptable level of risk, which 
is 1. 
7.4 Conclusion 
Fire accidents are among the most frequent accidents occurring on offshore facilities. 
While the heat radiation caused by the fire is the main reason for fatalities/injuries for 
offshore personnel, the toxic combustion products are a matter of concern due to their 
harmful effects, and they also seriously jeopardize evacuation. Predicting the 
concentration of toxic substances and their behaviour at the facility is therefore a key 
issue in safety measure design and evacuation planning. However, designing safety 
measures based on the predicted contaminants' concentration is not an appropriate 
approach, specifically when dealing with a mixture of contaminants which are 
combustion products. The problem arises from the fact that the concentration of different 
contaminants cannot be added. Moreover, the exposure duration which any person 
spends at different locations of the facility plays a significant role as well. 
A risk-based approach is useful as it considers the time spent by any individual at various 
locations of an installation through an exposure assessment step. This approach is also 
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useful for the mixture of contaminants; the additivity characteristic of a risk-based 
approach enables the addition of risk values of different substances. 
In the current study, a risk-based approach is proposed to model toxic dispersion at an 
offshore facility. Using FLACS CFDs code, the dispersion of the contaminants of 
concern (CO, N02 and CH4) after an LNG fire at an offshore installation was modeled. 
Then, considering the exposure time at different locations of the plant including the 
process area, the office area and the residential area, the Hazard Quotient (risk) for the 
contaminants of concern was estimated and shown as contours over the entire facility. 
While the process area (8 hr.dai1 exposure time) has the highest value of individual 
risks, most of the office area (4 hr.dai1 exposure time) and the entire residential area (12 
hr.dai1 exposure time) were observed to have lower risk values. Due to the higher 
concentration and longer exposure time, the higher values of risk are reasonable in the 
process area. The exposure time is higher than any other place in residential areas, but 
the risk is negligible due to low concentrations. The Riskr which is estimated through the 
addition of risks of all contaminants shows different results; significant portions of the 
office exceed the acceptable level of risk which is 1. 
Considering the exposure time and its additivity characteristic, the risk-based approach is 
then more useful compared to any concentration-based approach in toxic dispersion 
assessment. It helps to design safety measures to minimize the harmful effects of the 
toxic substances and also provides a tool for effective emergency management. 
.-------------------------------------------------- - --
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8 Conclusions, and recommendations 
8.1 Conclusions 
The main conclusions of this study are: 
8.1.1 New equations to model emission factors 
This study concluded that applying a non-linear regressiOn m order to develop 
correlation equation for estimating emission factors is a more effective way than the 
linear regression used by USEP A studies. The results obtained through the current study 
demonstrate a better estimation of emission leak rates in four categories of components 
including pump-seals, flanges, open-ended lines and others. Thus, the new sets of 
equations developed through the current research can replace USEP A correlation 
equations. 
Although the results obtained for other categories including connectors and valves were 
almost similar in both approaches, the qualitative comparison of both approaches 
highlights better accuracy using the new methodology proposed in this thesis. 
8.1.2 Systematic approach to model vapour cloud explosion 
A systematic approach to model the VCE in oil and gas facilities was proposed through 
the current study. While CFD codes are commonly used to simulate the VCE 
phenomenon in offshore/onshore oil and gas facilities, there is no agreed standard 
systematic procedure to do the analysis. This causes significant variability in the 
modeling approaches and also in the results of such analysis. Thus, the current study 
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proposed an approach to highlight the various steps involved in the VCE modeling. 
These steps were divided into two major sections; dispersion modeling and explosion 
simulation. The required sub-steps, including various parameter definitions and 
sensitivity analysis, were also discussed in detail to better explain the VCE modeling. 
8.1.3 Integration of the dispersion of flammable vapour with explosion modeling 
Here, the importance of the dispersion characteristics of flammable vapour release is 
discussed. Dispersion of flammable vapour is an important step in consequence 
assessment and it significantly influences the low and high limits of the flammable 
vapour, which control the explosion characteristics. Although these days CFD codes are 
used in VCE modeling, the major limitation of these studies is the consideration of the 
uniform stoichiometric volume of flammable vapour, ignoring the dispersion 
phenomenon. In this research, the dispersion simulation was integrated with the VCE 
modeling which makes this work unique. 
8.1.4 Integrated modeling of fire and explosion consequences 
The study introduced a novel approach using CFD codes to model consequences after 
hydrocarbon release. While consequence modeling has been extensively studied for 
individual fire and explosion accidents and also for domino effects, the interaction 
between events (fire and explosion) in a unit has been missing. In the present work, a 
novel systematic methodology to model the evolving accident scenario is developed and 
applied to two case studies. This methodology used CFD codes FLACS and FDS to 
model explosion and fire consequences, respectively. An integrated approach was 
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subsequently adopted to create the cumulative risk profile of an offshore installation. 
Through this study, it has been confirmed that the integrated methodology is more 
effective in assessing damage potential, if an accident occurs. This study helps in 
designing safety measures and developing an effective emergency management system. 
8.1.5 Risk-based approach for toxicity assessment 
This study developed a risk-based approach to assess the effects of combustion products 
dispersion in semi-confined and confined areas of an offshore installation. Toxic 
assessment based only on concentrations of contaminants lacks the rigour required. 
Safety measure design based on such an approach may be less effective. An individual 
spends different durations in various locations of an offshore installation, making the 
exposure time an important parameter. Combustion products vary significantly in their 
compositions, depending on source and type of combustion. To assess exposure, 
concentrations of different contaminants cannot be added. A risk-based approach, 
however, considers the time that an individual spends in different locations of a platform 
in estimating the risk. In addition, risk has an additive characteristic that enables a risk-
based approach to take into account the cumulative effects caused from various toxic 
constituents. The proposed methodology is tested with a case study; the overall risk 
profile of an offshore installation has been developed and analyzed for safety measure 
design including emergency management. The case study has confirmed the more 
effective use of a risk-based approach over a concentration-based one. 
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8.2 Recommendations 
The present work introduces new approaches and attempts to address some of the 
limitations of existing techniques related to consequence modeling and risk assessment 
of oil and gas industries. This study can be further improved and extended. Below is a 
list of important recommendations to extend the present work. 
8.2.1 CFD explosion modeling 
The study has shown the effective use of CFD codes in VCE accident modeling. 
However, the use of CFD codes to prevent accidents or at least decrease the harmful 
effects of accidents has not been studied in this work. Using CFD codes to analyze the 
effects of natural and mechanical ventilation rates at an installation to prevent the 
formation of flammable vapour is an effective way to prevent a fire and explosion. This 
could be further explored. In addition, different configurations of 
confinement/congestion at a platform also affect the severity of the explosion 
overpressure that can be analyzed through the application of CFD codes. Blast walls are 
effective ways of reducing the harmful effects of explosion overpressure. Thus, the 
configuration and technical characteristics of blast walls/relief valves can be evaluated 
using the proposed approaches and CFD codes. 
8.2.2 Integrated consequence modeling 
The study has demonstrated the effective use of an integrated approach of consequence 
modeling. Further studies could consider stronger dependence and interactions between 
events and also take into account the cumulative effects caused by various damage types. 
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Considering other events involved in offshore accidents such as the combustion products 
inhaled by individuals or damages to the offshore structures combined with the 
mentioned events (fire and explosion) is recommended for further study. 
The effective use of CFD codes in accident modeling was also shown through various 
case studies in the current work. However, it should be mentioned that the current 
available CFD codes are only capable of modeling individual events; in the current study 
FLACS has been used to model the explosion and FDS has been exploited to simulate 
the fire. There is no tool available that could model an evolving accident scenario. Thus, 
further studies on developing a new generation of CFD codes capable of modeling 
evolving accident scenarios are recommended. 
8.2.3 Toxic dispersion modeling 
The study has confirmed the priority of a risk-based approach in combustion products 
toxicity assessment over concentration-based methods. Future studies can focus on an 
extensive evaluation of combustion products to provide a comprehensive cumulative 
toxic risk profile for offshore installations. 
Taking into account the cumulative risk caused by the combination of toxic 
contaminants, fire heat load and explosion overpressure is also recommended for future 
study. This will be very useful for safety measures design and emergency preparedness 
actions. 
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8.2.4 Data uncertainty analysis 
Different approaches and models proposed in the present work require a large set of data. 
Procuring such a large set of precise data is often very difficult. It is recommended to 
integrate data uncertainty and a sensitivity analysis approach to the currently proposed 
models. This would help to identify critical data needed, and thus a focused approach to 
collect essential data. It will also help to quantify the uncertainty associated with the 
estimated results based on the uncertainty of the input data. 




